Revisiting human responsibilities: prospects and challenges by Smith, Liesl Ann Lynn
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 T
ow
n
 
 
 
 
 
Revisiting Human Responsibilities: Prospects and Challenges 
 
A minor dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the 
award of the degree of 
Master of Arts in International Relations 
 
Liesl Ann Lynn Smith (SMTLIE003) 
BA (UKZN), BA Hons (UKZN) 
 
Department of Political Studies 
Faculty of Humanities 
University of Cape Town 
2013 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The copyright of this thesis vests in the author. No 
quotation from it or information derived from it is to be 
published without full acknowledgement of the source. 
The thesis is to be used for private study or non-
commercial research purposes only. 
 
Published by the University of Cape Town (UCT) in terms 
of the non-exclusive license granted to UCT by the author. 
 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
f C
ap
e T
ow
n
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 T
ow
n
ii 
 
Declaration 
 
This work has not been submitted previously, in whole or in part, for the award 
of any degree. I hereby declare that it is my own work. Each significant contribution 
to, and quotation in, this dissertation from the work, or works, of other persons duly 
has been attributed, cited and referenced. 
 
 
Signature _________________________ Date _________________________  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 T
ow
n
iii 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
I would like to thank my supervisor, Dr John Akokpari, for his invaluable 
intellectual guidance, patience and encouragement throughout this research project 
and for his unceasing willingness to accommodate my creative ideas and 
discoveries. 
 
I am grateful for the significant roles played by academic staff members at the 
University of KwaZulu-Natal, the University of Calgary and, most recently, the 
Department of Political Studies at the University of Cape Town. I am particularly 
grateful for the roles played by Prof. Annette Seegers, Prof. André du Toit, Prof. 
Robert Schrire, Dr Harry Stephan and Dr Thiven Reddy in challenging me to develop 
my analytical skills and in inspiring me in my pursuit of knowledge. Gratitude is due, 
also, to administrative staff members, including Joanne Polzin and Wahieda Gajjar, 
for always making an extra effort in assisting my fellow postgraduate students and 
me at the Department of Political Studies. 
 
I am thankful to my immediate and extended family, friends and fellow 
postgraduate students, of which there simply are too many to mention individually, 
for their ongoing interest in my academic pursuits and for their continual support and 
encouragement during this particular endeavour. I am especially thankful to my 
parents, Vernon Leister Smith and Linda Smith, for instilling within me a desire to 
learn and for encouraging me always to complete each task to the best of my ability. 
 
Lastly, it is an honour for me to thank my Heavenly Father for giving me 
abundant life and for enabling me to be His ‘hands’ and ‘feet’. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 T
ow
n
iv 
 
 
 
 
 
“‘I have the right to do anything’, you say, but not everything is beneficial.       
‘I have the right to do anything’, but not everything is constructive.” 
1 Corinthians 10:23 (New International Version Bible) 
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Abstract 
 
Since the drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) 
(1948), the extent to which individuals should bear responsibilities for the fulfilment of 
universal human rights has been a contentiously debated subject. Despite conflicting 
value-based claims, the approach of international human rights law traditionally has 
been to recognise states as primary obligation bearers. While the UDHR focuses 
primarily on state obligations, deliberately unspecified duties of individuals are 
included under Article 29(1). The meaning of these duties has remained contested, 
often by relativist critics claiming that a stronger focus on responsibilities would 
provide a more balanced approach to human rights. The end of the Cold War 
brought a renewed interest in the normative potential of human rights and a parallel 
renewal of relativist objections to the universality of the UDHR. In this context 
transnational campaigns have emerged to advocate for a universal declaration of 
human responsibilities complementary to the UDHR. The issue has received 
attention from a number of initiatives, including those of United Nations bodies and 
agencies and of nongovernmental organisations. The most prominent of these 
initiatives have received firm opposition from influential Western state and non-state 
actors. Approaching the topic from a constructivist perspective, this dissertation 
draws on the social movement literature on the international political opportunity 
structure to argue that the activities of opponents to human responsibilities initiatives, 
particularly their framing of human responsibilities as having the potential to 
undermine and weaken the international human rights framework, have constrained 
the political opportunities available to human responsibilities campaigns. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
1.1. Overview 
 
Since the drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) 
(1948), the extent to which individuals should bear responsibilities for the fulfilment of 
universal human rights has been the subject of contentious debate (Knox, 2008:1; 
UNESCO, 1948). During the drafting process by a committee of the United Nations 
(UN), the global discussion on the interrelated rights and duties of individuals 
revealed that some cultural traditions reflect a dominant emphasis on human rights, 
while others underline the significance of individuals’ duties (UNESCO, 1948). This 
reality, also, was reflected in the drafting by the Organisation of American States of 
the ‘American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man’ (ADRDM) (1948), the 
earliest generic international human rights standard, which was adopted almost eight 
months prior to the adoption by the UN General Assembly (UNGA) of the UDHR 
(Knox, 2008:4; McCrudden, 2008:666; OAS, 1948; UNCHR, 2001:10, 2003b:13).  
 
Nevertheless, as the central ‘approach’ of the UDHR has remained to ‘define’ 
individuals’ rights and to render the ‘fulfilment’ of their rights an obligation of 
governments, a governmental ‘obligation’, rather than a duty of an individual, is 
attached to each human right (Hammarberg, 1999:i). The focus on states as the 
primary duty-bearers was a result of the context in which the UDHR was drafted, and 
this reality is fundamental for an understanding of the entire human rights framework 
that began with the introduction of the UDHR (Hammarberg, 1999:i). Indeed, in the 
aftermath of mass atrocities committed during the Second World War (WWII), the 
focus was on protecting citizens from governments (Hammarberg, 1999:i). Earlier 
human rights-related transnational advocacy efforts, also, traditionally, have focused 
on limiting governmental power. Even the efforts of the late British Member of 
Parliament (MP) William Wilberforce (1759–1833) in the early 1800s to protect the 
human rights of slaves, by abolishing the slave trade and, then, slavery, were 
directed at limiting governmental power, rather than that of individuals. 
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During the drafting of the UDHR, it was argued, nonetheless, that, even 
though states were to be the primary duty-bearers, the issue of the responsibilities of 
individuals still needed to be addressed. As each state is comprised of individuals, it 
was suggested that their cooperation is required for the fulfilment of human rights 
(UNCHR, 2002a:12). Following difficulty in reaching consensus on an appropriate 
wording of the notion of responsibility, the drafting committee eventually adopted the 
text, now standing as Article 29(1), on generic ‘duties to the community’ (UNCHR, 
2002a:12; UNGA, 1948). These duties were reiterated in the fifth paragraph of the 
common preamble to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) (1966) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR) (1966), which were drafted during the period between the late 
1940s and the early 1950s (UN, 1966a, 1966b; UNCHR, 2002a:12).  
 
As these ‘duties to the community’ held by each beneficiary of human rights 
remained undefined within the texts of the UDHR and the two International 
Covenants on Human Rights, together which comprise the International Bill of Rights 
(IBR), various individuals began to explore their meaning in closer detail. Due to a 
lack of clarity and emphasis on the ‘duties to the community’, in contrast to the 
dominant focus on universal human rights and the obligations of states to fulfil them, 
a claim commonly has been raised that individuals’ duties and responsibilities 
require further consideration (Clapham, 1998; Hammarberg, 1999:i). Indeed, despite 
the adoption of the IBR as a set of instruments focusing primarily on the universal 
rights of individuals and on the corresponding obligations of states to fulfil those 
rights, the contentious debate on the relationship between the rights and duties of 
individuals has persisted since the drafting of these documents.  
 
The issue received sporadic attention at the UN Commission on Human 
Rights (UNCHR) over the years since the adoption of the UDHR, and delegates such 
as Greek academic and diplomat Erica-Irene Daes (1925– ) and Cuban diplomat 
Miguel Alfonso Martínez (1935–2010), devoted serious consideration to the topic 
during the early 1980s and the early 2000s respectively. Daes was commissioned as 
UNSR in 1974 by the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) of the UN to conduct 
a study on individuals’ ‘duties to the community’, which was completed in 1982 
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(UNCHR, 2002a:2). In her final report, Daes suggests that ECOSOC permit the Sub-
Commission to draft a declaration concerning individuals’ responsibilities, with 
regard, particularly, to the ‘observance’ and ‘promotion’ of human rights and basic 
‘freedoms’ in contemporary society (UNCHR, 2002a:13). However, at the time, 
neither the UNCHR (2002a:13) nor ECOSOC found it ‘necessary’ or beneficial to 
give attention to the recommendation. 
 
Eighteen years later, in 2002, Martínez, also serving in the capacity of UNSR, 
was appointed by the ‘Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human 
Rights’, a subdivision of the UNCHR (2001:1, 2002a:5), to conduct a study, entitled 
‘Human Rights and Human Responsibilities’ (UNHCHR, 2000a, 2000b). During the 
period between 2000 and 2005, the issue of human responsibilities remained on the 
agenda of the UNCHR. Martínez submitted the ‘Pre-Draft Declaration on Human 
Social Responsibilities’ (DHSR) in 2003. While the declaration was welcomed by a 
number of delegations, it also received firm opposition from an array of Western 
state and non-state actors, including prominent human rights defenders, the press 
and influential academics. Following an attempt by the European Union (EU) to 
‘block’ further progress on the development of the declaration, ECOSOC intervened 
to call a vote in 2005, resulting in the dismissal of the subject of human 
responsibilities from the agenda of the UNCHR. 
 
Nevertheless, the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation 
(UNESCO), a specialised agency of the UN, has adopted a number of declarations 
on the responsibilities of individuals. For instance, UNESCO adopted the 
‘Declaration on the Responsibilities of the Present Generations toward Future 
Generations’ in November, 1997 (UNCHR, 2002:14). In his study on human rights 
and human responsibilities, Martínez states that, while finding the substantive 
provisions of this declaration of particular interest, time constraints had limited his 
efforts in exploring whether there had been any further developments on the 
document (UNCHR, 2002a:14). Another initiative at UNESCO (1999) was the 
‘Declaration of Human Duties and Responsibilities’, which was adopted by a group of 
prominent individuals in 1998 and was intended to be presented to UNESCO and, 
ultimately, to the UNGA for adoption. 
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In addition to the efforts of Daes, Martínez and various members of UNESCO 
to advocate and mediate for human responsibilities at the UN, a series of prominent 
independent transnational campaigns emerged in the nongovernmental arena during 
the late 1980s. This dissertation draws on the definition of campaigns offered by 
international relations theorist Charli Carpenter (2007:102) as involving concentrated 
‘efforts’ by ‘multiple organisations’ advocating for a certain ‘outcome’ for a particular 
issue. This dissertation, however, refers to each independent initiative of a UN body 
or agency or of an international NGO, lobbying for human responsibilities, as a single 
transnational campaign. These initiatives have included those of independent 
commissions, such as the Club of Rome (CR), the International Council of Human 
Duties (ICHD) and the InterAction Council (IAC), whose memberships comprise, but 
are not limited to, former statesmen, working in their personal capacities, as well as 
prominent theologians, academics and other experts (Hammarberg, 1999:i). Since 
the 1980s, some of these initiatives, with varying and perhaps lessening degrees of 
influence, continue to advocate for human responsibilities today. 
 
While a common objective of many of these initiatives, including those of 
various nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) and UN bodies and agencies, has 
been to garner support for the drafting and adoption by the UNGA of a universal 
declaration of human responsibilities, in order to complement the UDHR, their goal 
has not been realised. Indeed, they repeatedly have met strong opposition to their 
efforts from a range of actors, including Western governments and influential 
members of Western civil society, such as the media, prominent academics and 
human rights NGOs, including Amnesty International (AI) and the International 
Commission of Jurists (ICJ). 
 
 
1.2. Research Aims 
 
Seeking to clarify the likely reasons for the repeated failures of various 
initiatives to keep the issue of human responsibilities on the agenda of relevant UN 
bodies and, ultimately, to see a universal declaration of human responsibilities 
adopted by the UNGA, this dissertation explores the challenges encountered by a 
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number of transnational campaigns for human responsibilities during the period 
between the early 1980s and the early 2000s. Due to the emergence of opposing 
initiatives, or ‘counter-campaigns’, it is argued that movement-countermovement 
dynamics have been a key factor constraining the efforts of human responsibilities 
campaigns. Drawing on the definition of ‘counter-movements’ offered by David 
Meyer and Suzanne Staggenborg (1996:1631), this dissertation defines ‘counter-
campaigns’ as initiatives proposing opposing assertions ‘simultaneously’ to those 
offered by an ‘original’ campaign. Because the potential policy successes of human 
responsibilities campaigns threaten existing interests, counter-campaigns emerged 
to impede their efforts.  
 
Thus, contextual factors of the international political opportunity structure, 
including the possibility for ‘counter-mobilisation’, as well as the historical 
background of the ongoing contentious value conflict over the duties of individuals 
under international human rights law, help aid in explaining the ineffectiveness of 
advocacy efforts for human responsibilities. Identifying the dominant strategies and 
tactics, particularly the use of collective action frames, employed by proponents of 
human responsibilities and their opponents, it is proposed that the framing of human 
responsibilities as having the ‘potential’ to ‘undermine’ and ‘weaken’ the international 
human rights legal framework was more effective than the framing of human 
responsibilities as being compatible with and complementary to universal human 
rights, due to the resonance of the former frames with pre-existing norms and to the 
credibility of their advocates. It is argued that such ‘blocking’ strategies of opponents 
to the idea of potential human responsibilities standards have been effective in 
impeding the development of a universal declaration of human responsibilities 
(Hertel, 2005:104). 
 
 
1.3. Theoretical Framework 
 
Approaching transnational advocacy for human responsibilities from a social 
constructivist perspective, this dissertation seeks to portray the influence of moral 
norms, values and ideas of non-state actors on states, international organisations, 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 T
ow
n
6 
 
international politics and international standard-setting. This view counters the more 
dominant neorealist and neoliberal accounts of international relations, which focus 
primarily on states, power and national interest (Bob, 2005:191; Busby, 2007:249; 
Risse & Sikkink, 1999:6-7). These latter schools of thought assume that national 
interest can be explained by observing the ‘conditions’ or ‘structure’ of the 
international system (Busby, 2007:249).  
 
The literature on social movements, similarly, typically places significance on 
‘contextual factors’, specifically on political opportunity structures, in seeking to 
explain ‘variation’ in ‘mobilisation’, ‘strategies’ and ‘outcomes’ of movements 
(Shawki, 2010:383). The ‘political opportunity structure’ is understood to comprise a 
number of elements, such as the extent to which political power is centralised, the 
‘positions’ of political parties and the availability of ‘international alliances’, which 
affect the degree to which a political system is shielded from ‘civil society’ and the 
extent to which it is permissive to social movements’ ‘demands’ (Shawki, 2010:384).  
 
Adopting a constructivist approach to political opportunity structures, this 
dissertation acknowledges the roles of key ‘actors’, including ‘allies’, opponents, 
‘counter-movements’ and the broader ‘public’, in further influencing ‘structures’ of 
‘political opportunities’ available to transnational campaigns, by either ‘facilitating’ or 
‘constraining’ their activities (Shawki, 2010:384). A number of authors argue that 
‘relatively stable’ features of ‘political opportunity’, including ‘traditions’ and 
‘institutions’, should be ‘distinguished’ from more ‘volatile’ features, such as ‘public 
policy’, ‘political discourse’ and ‘elite alignment’, and that political opportunity should 
be understood not as an unalterable ‘external environment’, but as one that can be 
adjusted by advocates (Gamson & Meyer, 1996:277; Meyer & Staggenborg, 
1996:1634). Indeed, while the ‘more stable’ features of a political opportunity 
structure significantly facilitate or constrain the opportunities available to advocates, 
competing actors can play a role in further facilitating or constraining such 
opportunities (Meyer & Staggenborg, 1996:1634).   
 
Much of the early literature on political opportunity structures was based on 
civil rights movements. Peter Eisinger’s (1972) explanation of the ‘conditions’ of 
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American ‘protest behaviour’ during the 1960s is regarded as the earliest overt 
application of a ‘political opportunity framework’ (Meyer & Minkoff, 2004:1459). 
Studies by Kenneth Andrews (2002) and by Benjamin Lind and Judith Stepan-Norris 
(2011) also have applied the concept of the political opportunity structure to 
American civil rights movements of the 1960s. Other more recent accounts by 
theorists, such as Gary Marks and Doug McAdam (1999), Sidney Tarrow (2006) and 
Noha Shawki (2010), have adapted the concept of the political opportunity structure 
to the transnational context. Shawki (2010) applies the concept to intergovernmental 
organisations, specifically the UN, noting contextual factors, such as international 
conference diplomacy and movement-countermovement dynamics, as central in 
explaining the activities and political outcomes of transnational campaigns. 
 
Adopting the concept of the ‘international political opportunity structure’, this 
dissertation takes into account the ‘structural’, or ‘institutionally-oriented’, aspects of 
the UN system, including institutional access and procedures of UN bodies, as well 
as ‘non-structural’, or ‘extra-institutional’, features, including ‘agency’ and the 
‘strategies’ and ‘tactics’ employed by advocates (Meyer & Staggenborg, 1996:1650; 
Shawki, 2010:384-385, 2011:105). In this dissertation, the concept of ‘agency’ 
encompasses the identities of ‘political entrepreneurs’ and other proponents of 
human responsibilities, as well as the significant roles played by individual ‘policy 
gatekeepers’, key potential ‘veto players’ and other ‘institutional stakeholders’ in 
facilitating and constraining human rights-related policy (Busby, 2007:254-255; 
Carpenter, 2007:114-115; Fukuda-Parr & Hulme, 2011:17; Meyer & Staggenborg, 
2007:3). The theoretical model of the international political opportunity structure is 
employed to call attention to such structural and non-structural factors serving to 
facilitate and constrain the perceived permissiveness of the UN to the issue of 
human responsibilities.  
 
While the literature on transnational campaigns generally has focused 
primarily on the advocacy efforts of NGOs ‘on the ground’, Hovey (1997:224) 
develops an explanation on various ‘stages of intercession’, involving both the 
advocacy efforts of NGOs and the intermediary efforts of their representatives within 
the intergovernmental arena of the UNCHR. The six stages identified by Hovey 
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(1997:214) include ‘raising the issue’, ‘seeking sympathetic partners and allies’, 
‘educating about the issue’, ‘working the system’, ‘facilitating agreement between 
disputants’ and ‘seeking consensus’. While the first three stages involve primarily the 
role of ‘advocacy’, the remaining three relate to that of ‘mediation’ (Hovey, 1997:216-
217). While acknowledging that these stages are not necessarily consecutive and 
that they are not intended to ‘exhaust’ the kinds of activities employed by NGOs, 
Hovey (1997:217) notes that they do portray the wide-ranging roles of such non-
state actors in promoting, facilitating and constraining agreements among 
governments. 
 
This dissertation gives attention both to the advocacy efforts of NGOs and 
other civil society members ‘on the ground’ and to the mediation by their 
representatives in the intergovernmental arenas of the UNCHR and ECOSOC 
(Hovey, 1997:224). Particular attention is given to the ‘institutionally-oriented’ and 
‘extra-institutional’ contextual factors of the intergovernmental arenas of these UN 
bodies in ‘facilitating’ and ‘constraining’ the activities and political outcomes of the 
advocacy and mediation efforts of proponents for human responsibilities and of their 
opponents (Meyer & Staggenborg, 1996:1650; Shawki, 2010:384). 
 
Suggesting that conflict between movements and counter-movements 
‘increases’ when a political opportunity structure ‘enables’ but does not ‘satisfy 
challengers’, Meyer and Staggenborg (1996:1628, 1637) argue that ‘federal’ political 
opportunity structures tend to encounter ongoing ‘conflict’ between movements and 
counter-movements, because the division of political authority across ‘branches of 
government’ means that advocates on each ‘side’ of a policy-related can be 
expected to experience a combination of ‘governmental support’ and challenges 
from various governmental branches. As political power is divided within and among 
the various bodies of the UN, the intergovernmental political opportunity structures of 
these bodies can be understood as federal in nature.  
 
During its existence, the UNCHR, for instance, was comprised of fifty-three 
delegates, who were elected state representatives and who adopted resolutions by 
vote (Alvarez, 2005:435). During the deliberations concerning the duties of 
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individuals under Article 29(1) of the UDHR, there typically have been two opposing 
sides. The first group has included the developed countries of the Global North and 
observers for human rights organisations, while the second group has included the 
developing countries of the South. This was the case during the drafting in 1993 of 
the Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and Organs of 
Society to Promote and Protect Universally Recognised Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (1998), which commonly is referred to as the Declaration on 
Human Rights Defenders (DHRD), and during the deliberations concerning the study 
on human rights and human responsibilities on the agenda of the UNCHR during the 
period between 2000 and 2005 (UNCHR, 1993; UNGA, 1998a). Furthermore, 
reactions to the IAC Declaration during the late 1990s reflected a similar polarisation 
on the issue between developed and developing states.  
 
Applying insights from international regime theory to political opportunity 
structures, Shawki (2010:388-389) distinguishes between consensual and 
dissentious conflicts, arguing that conflicts over values tend to be dissentious in 
nature. As value conflicts take place when ‘beliefs’ and ‘values’ of dissimilar actors 
are ‘incompatible’, Shawki (2010:289) suggests that they tend to have a ‘relatively 
limited’ political opportunity structure. Recognising the likelihood of controversy and 
‘contestation’ over value-based claims, advocates, at times, deliberately attempt to 
‘avoid’ raising issues reflective of existing ‘ideational divides’ (Fukuda-Parr & Hulme, 
2011:29-30). However, ideas proposed about individual duties and responsibilities, 
which do not ‘resonate’ with ‘pre-existing’ international human rights legal standards, 
involve ‘symbolic’ issues, reflective of deep-seated value cleavages, and 
transnational campaigns advocating directly for such ideas, therefore, arguably, 
cannot avoid such conflicts over symbolic values (Boström, 2011:9; Finnemore & 
Sikkink, 1998:908; Florini, 1996:377; Meyer & Staggenborg, 1996:1639; Payne, 
2001:43). 
  
This dissertation argues that the issue of human responsibilities inevitably 
generates a conflict over values. Due to the federal nature of the intergovernmental 
political structure of the UN and the resultant difficulty in resolving such conflicts, it 
appears that interactions between advocates for human responsibilities and their 
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opponents likely will be continuous (Meyer & Staggenborg, 1996:1654). This view 
suggests that transnational campaigns for human responsibilities may continue to 
participate in various strategies ‘over time’ and to relocate to alternative collective 
action arenas, depending on changes in political opportunity, which, in turn, can be 
expected to occur, as campaigns and their opponents alter ‘public policies’ and the 
perceived ‘political opportunities’ available to them (Meyer & Staggenborg, 
1996:1654). 
 
 
1.4. Research Methodology 
 
In order to fulfil the research aims of this dissertation, which takes the form of 
a theoretical case study, both primary and secondary literary sources are assessed. 
Primary sources include, but are not necessarily limited to, international and regional 
legal instruments, particularly international and regional human rights standards, as 
well as a selection of press releases and reports of international NGOs and UN 
bodies and agencies. Secondary sources include books, journal articles, conference 
papers and news articles. The information drawn from these sources is employed 
according to the applicable theoretical framework of the international political 
opportunity structure. 
 
The various transnational campaigns for human responsibilities discussed in 
this dissertation are presented as a single case study in the second chapter. 
Particular attention is given to the Universal Declaration of Human Responsibilities 
(IAC Declaration) (1997) proposed by the IAC and to the DHSR (2003) proposed by 
Martínez, as these two declarations have received the most responses by 
governments, human rights activists, academia and the media. Indeed, such a focus 
on these initiatives is logical, given that they, arguably, have been the most 
successful transnational campaigns for human responsibilities during the period 
between the early 1980s and present times. In the third chapter, this dissertation 
focuses on the interactions between these campaigns and their opponents. 
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1.5. Research Limitations 
 
The concept and rhetoric of human responsibilities comprise a contentious 
field of debate, both in the practice of adopting international legal instruments and 
academically. The issue of human responsibilities, therefore, provides many possible 
routes of academic study, regarding the potential for the development of an 
international norm of human responsibilities. A comprehensive consideration of the 
vast number of transnational campaigns for human responsibilities discovered during 
the course of this study, however, is beyond the scope of this dissertation, as is a 
comprehensive analysis of the varied theoretical and philosophical underpinnings 
and justifications given for the concept of human responsibilities in historical and 
contemporary times. This dissertation, also, is limited to the temporal period 
beginning at the time at which Daes was commissioned by ECOSOC to conduct a 
study on the duties of individuals in the early 1970s, leading up to present times. 
 
 
1.6. Chapter Outline 
 
The sections of this dissertation are organised within four chapters, including 
this introductory overview chapter. The second chapter, which is divided into three 
main sections, first defines important concepts and then builds on the factual 
overview of transnational campaigns for human responsibilities provided in the 
introductory chapter. The various opportunities, strategies and tactics employed by 
these campaigns, during the period between the 1980s and present times, to 
propose the development and adoption by the UNGA of a universal declaration of 
human responsibilities, then, are identified.  
 
The effectiveness of the framing of human responsibilities as compatible with 
and complementary to human rights is assessed in terms of its credibility and its 
resonance with the international human rights legal framework. Drawing on the 
political opportunity approach, the partial success of the strategic framing techniques 
used by advocates in placing the issue of human responsibilities on the international 
agenda is discussed. The international political opportunity structure provides both 
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facilitating and constraining factors affecting transnational campaigns for human 
responsibilities. A key constraint has been the emergence of opposing initiatives 
impeding the development of a universal declaration of human responsibilities. 
 
The third chapter begins by building further on the factual overview provided 
in the introductory chapter. After providing an historical account of the emergence of 
initiatives countering human responsibilities campaigns and impeding the 
development of a universal declaration of human responsibilities, the third chapter 
identifies the dominant opportunities and strategies used by the opponents of such 
campaigns. Such strategies and tactics are assessed in terms of their effectiveness, 
in contrast with the ineffective efforts of human responsibilities campaigns. The 
interactions between campaigns and their opposition, as well as the repercussions of 
such relations, are discussed. A focus on such relations is employed to emphasise 
the facilitating and constraining factors of the international political opportunity 
structure, arising from the significant role played by opponents to the issue of human 
responsibilities, particularly in constraining the development of a universal 
declaration of human responsibilities. The strategic tactics employed by such 
opponents of human responsibilities campaigns are identified as a key factor 
explaining the ineffectiveness of the efforts of transnational campaigns to advocate 
and mediate for the adoption by the UNGA of a universal declaration of human 
responsibilities. 
 
The fourth and final chapter concludes by presenting the cumulative findings 
and implications of the research undertaken and proposes areas in which additional 
research might be conducted in order to develop a dynamic approach to addressing 
difficulties and opportunities encountered by transnational campaigns for human 
responsibilities, which necessarily takes into account both the global institutional 
dynamics of the UN and extra-institutional factors, including ongoing trans-cultural 
conflicts over values. 
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Chapter 2 
Toward a Universal Declaration of Human Responsibilities? 
 
2.1. Overview 
 
In order to facilitate the application of the political opportunity framework, a 
discussion on the substantive factors surrounding the issue of human responsibilities 
is necessary. Once having arrived at an appropriate working definition of the concept 
of human responsibilities, this chapter provides some historical background, first, on 
the ongoing debate on the role of individuals’ duties under international human rights 
law and, subsequently, on a selected number of seemingly most prominent initiatives 
advocating for human responsibilities during the period between the early 1980s and 
the early 2000s. The application section of this chapter proceeds to consider the 
opportunities, strategies and tactics employed by human responsibilities initiatives, 
which led to their partial success, to the degree that they were able effectively to set 
the issue on the international agenda, in turn, inviting firm and decisive opposition to 
their objectives.  
 
 
2.2. Defining Human Responsibilities 
 
Before providing some historical background on the value conflict over the 
duties and responsibilities of individuals under international human rights law, it 
seems necessary, first, to arrive at a definition of the concept of human 
responsibilities. The transnational campaigns addressed by this dissertation 
commonly suggest that human responsibilities refer to those responsibilities of 
individuals that are necessary for the fulfilment of human rights. The concept of 
human responsibilities inherently is related to and derived from that of human rights. 
Human responsibilities refer to those duties or responsibilities regarded as 
‘attributable’ to every person, thus applying the principles of universality and 
inalienability to human responsibilities (UNCHR, 2002a:9). Indeed, it follows from this 
definition that, if human rights are universal and inalienable, so too are human 
responsibilities.  
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 T
ow
n
14 
 
The defining of human responsibilities raises the ‘semantic question’ relating 
to the application by the UN of the concepts of individual responsibility, duty and 
obligation (UNCHR, 2002a:7). While Article 29(1) of the UDHR refers to individuals’ 
‘duties to the community’, which are reiterated within the fifth paragraph of the 
common preamble to the International Covenants on Human Rights, Martínez finds 
that, during the discussions prior to the adoption of these instruments, the ‘terms’ of 
responsibility, duty and obligation, particularly responsibility and duty, often were 
used ‘interchangeably’ (UN, 1966a, 1966b; UNCHR, 2002a:8).  
 
While these terms commonly have been conflated, this dissertation follows on 
from the suggestion of Martínez to use only the terms of duty and responsibility 
‘interchangeably’, as they seem more appropriate to stipulate extra-legal ‘actions’ 
and ‘attitudes’, relating  to ‘ethics’ and ‘morality’, rather than to the more ‘formal’ 
constraints of ‘positive law’ (UNCHR, 2002a:9). In UN reports and international 
human rights instruments, the terms of ‘duty’ and ‘responsibility’ generally have been 
used to refer to the unspecified individual ‘duties to the community’, while the term of 
‘obligation’ has been used to refer to the legal obligations of states, formalised by the 
signing and ratification of international treaties (UNGA, 1948; UN, 1966a, 1966b, 
1969). Furthermore, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) (1969) 
significantly makes no mention of duties or responsibilities, but focuses on the legal 
obligations of states arising from treaties (UN, 1969). These definitions of the 
concepts of responsibility, duty and obligation also are consistent with the use by 
transnational campaigns for human responsibilities of the terms of responsibility and 
duty to refer to ‘moral’ and ‘ethical’ principles applicable to individuals, contrary to the 
legal obligations assigned to states under international law (IAC, 1997; UNCHR, 
2002a:9). 
 
 
2.3. Background on the Value Conflict over the Duties of Individuals under     
       International Human Rights Law (1940s–1990s) 
 
The issue of human responsibilities typically is discussed in relation to human 
rights. Presenting the issue as though ‘rights’ and ‘responsibilities’ are in competition 
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and that their advocates are entirely dissimilar, proponents of human responsibilities 
generally claim that, while rights are individualistic and antisocial, responsibilities, 
conversely, are ‘social’ and ‘collective’ and as connotative of ‘appropriate’ and 
‘traditional values’ (Steiner & Alston, 2000:337-338). However, it has been 
contended that the alleged conflict between rights and responsibilities encounters a 
number of difficulties and that the issue is not really ‘conceptual’ but rather one of 
‘emphasis’ (Clapham, 1998; Steiner & Alston, 2000:338). Indeed, the inclusion of the 
individual’s ‘duties to the community’ under the IBR demonstrates a universal 
acknowledgement of the existence of individual duties.  
 
Nevertheless, since the drafting of the UDHR during the early 1940s, the 
traditional ‘approach’ of international human rights law deliberately and, arguably, 
necessarily has been to assign the primary obligation for human rights protection to 
states, rather than to individuals (Clapham, 1998; Hammarberg, 1999:i; Knox, 
2008:1). Therefore, the value conflict over the ‘duties to the community’, which 
emerged during the drafting of the UDHR, should be understood not as a debate on 
the existence or nonexistence of individual duties, but rather as the question of to 
whom international human rights law normatively should assign the primary 
responsibility, duty or obligation for the protection, promotion and fulfilment of 
universal human rights (Clapham, 1998; Steiner & Alston, 2000:337-338). While the 
traditional ‘approach’ of international human rights law has been to recognise states 
as owing the individual certain rights, which are to be respected within the jurisdiction 
of the state, various state and non-state actors have ‘challenged’ this approach over 
the years (Clapham, 1998; Hammarberg, 1999:i; Knox, 2008:1). The following 
section considers the discussions and debates over the extent to which the drafters 
of several international human rights instruments have argued that an emphasis on 
individuals’ duties is necessary. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 T
ow
n
16 
 
2.3.1. The Duties of Individuals under the Universal Declaration of Human  
Rights (1948) 
 
In order to understand fully the traditional ‘approach’ of international human 
rights law in assigning the primary obligation of human rights protection to states, it is 
necessary to realise the international context in which the idea of the IBR first 
emerged (Hammarberg, 1999:i). Toward the end of WWII, proponents of universal 
human rights raised the idea as a means of seeking to counter the potential for 
states to abuse the human dignity of individuals within their jurisdictions. In this 
sense, the inclusion of human rights within international legal instruments limited the 
previously absolute sovereignty of states (Chesterman et al., 2008:448; Forsythe, 
2000:188). In the aftermath of the Holocaust and other mass atrocities that occurred 
during the war, the emerging framework of international human rights law, beginning 
in 1946 with the two-year drafting process by a UN drafting committee of the UDHR, 
understandably and necessarily focused on limiting the sovereign power of states. 
 
While Article 29(1) of the UDHR includes individuals’ ‘duties to the 
community’, these duties deliberately are unspecific, as the drafters of the UDHR did 
not recognise a need to protect the state from the power of individuals (UNCHR, 
2002a:11). When the Third Committee of the UNGA considered the text of the draft 
declaration in 1948, a major challenge was to word the notion of responsibility in a 
formulation that would achieve consensus among all of its participants (UNCHR, 
2002:12). With thirty-five votes to none and with only six abstentions, the drafting 
committee finally adopted the generic text, which, now standing as Article 29(1), 
states that, “everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free and full 
development of his personality is possible” (UNCHR, 2002:12; UNGA, 1948).  
 
Since the emergence of the UDHR, as the first phase in developing the IBR, 
human rights have been conceptualised as being legally entitled to individuals 
(Rimmer, 2010:21; Risse & Ropp, 1999:234). While the UDHR, as a UN declaration 
adopted by consensus, has no binding power, it was followed by the drafting of the 
International Covenants on Human Rights, which, once having been signed and 
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ratified by state parties, are legally binding (Conforti, 2005:300; Rimmer, 2010:21; 
Risse & Ropp, 1999:234). 
 
 
2.3.2. The Duties of Individuals under the International Covenants on Human  
Rights (1966) 
 
The ICCPR and the ICESCR, both of which were adopted in 1966 and ratified 
in 1976, contain, within the fifth paragraph of their common preamble, a restatement 
of the individual’s ‘duties to the community’ under the UDHR. This paragraph, which 
was drafted during the period between 1949 and 1952, states that, the individual, 
having duties to others and to the community, has a ‘responsibility’ to ‘strive’ toward 
the ‘observance’ and ‘promotion’ of the rights within in each Covenant (UN, 1966a, 
1966b; UNCHR, 2002a:12).  
 
Even during the years following the adoption and ratification of the 
International Covenants on Human Rights, academics continued to refer to the ‘lack’ 
of an appropriate ‘definition’ of the ‘duties to the community’ under the international 
human rights framework (Suter, 2012:47; UNCHR, 2002a:27). For instance, in 1968, 
on the twentieth anniversary of the adoption of the UDHR and two years after the 
adoption of the two Covenants, Austrian legal academic and journalist René Marcic 
(1956–1971), analysing the ‘duties to the community’ in an effort to find greater 
clarity on their implications, distinguished a range of positive and negative duties of 
individuals toward themselves and others (Suter, 2012:47). 
 
 
2.3.3. The Duties and Responsibilities of Individuals under the Declaration on           
          Human Rights Defenders (1998) 
  
In addition to the UDHR and the International Covenants on Human Rights, a 
number of more recent UN human rights standards, including the Declaration on the 
Right to Development (1986) and, of particular relevance to this dissertation, the 
DHRD, further develop the rhetoric of Article 29(1) of the UDHR (Giacomazzi, 
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2005:172; Petrasek & Takahashi, 1999:28; UNCHR, 2002a:26; UNGA, 1998a). As 
the objective of the DHRD is to expound on the right of individuals and groups of 
individuals to ‘protect’ and ‘promote’ human rights, it is regarded as a vital 
‘instrument’, offering legitimacy and ‘support’ to the ‘efforts’ of members of civil 
society, who are involved in defending human rights trans-nationally (Petrasek & 
Takahashi, 1999:30). 
 
Following the typical approach of international human rights law, the DHRD 
assigns obligations primarily to states, ensuring that human rights defenders can 
serve their function overtly and ‘effectively’, without reason to ‘fear’ possible 
‘harassment’ or ‘persecution’ (Petrasek & Takahashi, 1999:30). However, Article 18 
of the DHRD, which addresses individuals and restates the ‘duties to the community’ 
under the UDHR, further develops the rhetoric of these duties, specifying that they 
are intended to ‘safeguard’ and to aid in building ‘democracy’ and to advance a 
‘social’ and ‘international order’ favourable to human rights (Petrasek & Takahashi, 
1999:30; UNGA, 1998a). 
 
The drafting of the DHRD by a UNCHR (2002a:19) working group, involving 
state delegates and members of international human rights NGOs, such as AI, the 
ICJ and Human Rights First, took place during the thirteen-year period between 
1986 and 1998 (HRF, 2013). During the drafting of the DHRD in 1993, the UNCHR 
(2002a:19) delegates favouring the drafting of a definition of individuals’ duties or 
responsibilities to their ‘social environment’ generally included representatives of 
states of the Global South, while delegates of the North, or West, and observers for 
human rights NGOs, including AI and the ICJ, decisively were unwilling even to 
consider the inclusion of a definition of individual duties in a ‘modern human rights 
instrument’. Such delegates generally contended that it was unnecessary in 
contemporary times to ‘clarify’ and develop the ‘generic formulation’ of Article 29(1) 
of the UDHR (UNCHR, 2002a:19). Significantly, the Vienna Declaration and 
Programme of Action (VDPA) (1993), adopted during the same year, typically 
reaffirmed states’ obligations, rather than individuals’ duties, as prime in the 
provision of human rights.  
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The lack of attention given to the duties and responsibilities of individuals 
under the VDPA later generated a response from UNCHR delegates, seeking to 
‘balance’ human rights with human responsibilities. Indeed, according to the South 
Asian Human Rights Documentation Centre (SAHRDC), an NGO in consultative 
status with ECOSOC in 2003, the UNCHR encountered ‘unprecedented’ threats, 
following the ‘Vienna World Conference on Human Rights’ (VWCHR), due to the 
‘efforts’ of the Like-Minded Group (LMG), an informal alliance of human rights 
violating states, including Bhutan, China, India, Iran, Malaysia, Myanmar, Nepal, 
Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Vietnam, Algeria, Cuba, Egypt and Sudan (UNCHR, 2003c). 
Further challenges included, also, the barring of NGOs from human rights 
procedures at the UN (Sceats & Breslin, 2012:9; Stanley, 1998; UNCHR, 2003c, 
2005; UN Watch, 2007:6; 17). 
 
 
2.4. An Historical Account of Prominent Transnational Campaigns for 
       Human Responsibilities (1980s–2000s) 
 
During the 1960s and 1970s, various academics explored the ‘duties to the 
community’ under international human rights law. During the 1960s, Marcic 
conducted a study, which sought to clarify the ‘duties to the community’ under the 
UDHR (Suter, 2012:47). Daes conducted a similar study at ECOSOC during the 
eight-year period 1974 and 1982, as did UNESCO, also in 1982 (UNCHR, 2002a:2). 
Although Daes concludes her study by recommending that the UNCHR (2002a:13) 
should draft a declaration of individuals’ responsibilities, her suggestion was not 
considered relevant at the time.  
 
Toward the late 1980s, toward the end of the Cold War (CW), a number of 
transnational campaigns advocating more resolutely for human responsibilities 
emerged. While there have been numerous initiatives advocating for a universal 
declaration of human responsibilities, this dissertation is limited to the study of seven 
initiatives. Although, as an aside, it seems appropriate to mention the efforts of the 
late California-based Chinese academic and prominent activist Lucile Green (1922–
2005) to advocate for ‘A People’s Declaration of Human Responsibilities’ (“Lucile 
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Green”, 2005). Since she passed away in 2005, however, this particular initiative has 
discontinued. As each initiative has built on the work of previous advocates, the 
seven initiatives addressed by this dissertation together form a single case study 
(Suter, 2012:49). The following section provides an overview of these initiatives, 
beginning with the ECOSOC-mandated study presented by Daes in 1982. 
 
 
2.4.1. The ECOSOC-Commissioned Study on the Individual’s Duties to the  
Community (1982) 
 
ECOSOC, a ‘subsidiary body’ of the UNGA comprised of fifty-four members 
and tasked with upholding ‘international cooperation’ in ‘social’ and ‘economic’ 
arenas under the ‘authority’ of the UNGA, has a lengthy history of addressing the 
issue of individuals’ ‘duties to the community’ under international human rights law 
(Conforti, 2005:118; UNESCO, 1948). ECOSOC first faced the issue whilst drafting 
the UDHR (UNESCO, 1948). During the eight-year period between 1974 and 1982, 
Greek delegate Daes conducted an ECOSOC-commissioned study on the 
‘preparatory work’ that culminated in the adoption of the texts regarding individuals’ 
duties under the IBR (UNCHR, 2002a:2). Her final study, entitled ‘The Individual’s 
Duties to the Community and the Limitations on Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms under Article 29 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights’, was 
submitted to ECOSOC in 1982 (UNCHR, 2002a:2). The study was an effort to 
contribute toward defining such individual duties, thus addressing a supposed 
inconsistency in the provisions of the IBR on the subject (UNCHR, 2002a:13). 
 
During the time between August 1975 and October 1976, a ‘questionnaire’ 
was forwarded to governments by the UN Secretary-General (UNSG), on behalf of 
Daes, containing questions concerning the role of individuals’ societal duties or 
responsibilities (UNCHR, 2002a:18). All of the twenty-five respondents, excepting 
the government of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), were governments of 
the Global East or South (UNCHR, 2002a:29). Fifteen respondents claimed the 
existence of an evident ‘correlation’ between individuals’ rights or ‘freedoms’ toward 
society and the responsibilities or duties of the bearers of such rights (UNCHR, 
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2002a:18). The only ‘direct’ questioning of this correlation, labelling it a ‘fallacy’, was 
by the FRG, significantly the only Western state to respond (UNCHR, 2002a:18). 
 
Daes suggests that the ‘duties to the community’ under Article 29(1) of the 
UDHR deliberately are not specifically defined, because the fundamental objective of 
the UDHR necessarily is to protect individuals’ rights from the potential abuse of 
state power, whereas there is no apparent need to protect the state from individuals’ 
power (UNCHR, 2002a:11). She argues, nevertheless, that the provisions of 
individual duties under international human rights instruments essentially are ‘moral’ 
in nature and that the formulation of Article 29(1) comprises a ‘compromised text’, 
reflecting the complexity of the drafting of a ‘balanced’ formulation of such duties by 
delegates of diverse backgrounds (UNCHR, 2002a:11). In seeking to clarify the 
duties of individuals to other members of their community, Daes had suggested that 
they include both positive and negative duties of individuals toward themselves and 
toward others, thus offering a similar perspective to that proposed by Marcic in 1968 
(Suter, 2012:47; UNCHR, 2002a:13). 
 
Daes concludes her study with a suggestion for ECOSOC to commission the 
Sub-Commission of the UNCHR to draft a declaration on ‘principles’ regarding 
individuals’ responsibilities, concerning, in particular, the ‘observance’ and 
‘promotion’ of human rights and basic ‘freedoms’ in a contemporary society 
(UNCHR, 2002a:13). However, at the time, ECOSOC and the UNCHR (2002a:13) 
deemed the authorisation of such a declaration neither ‘necessary’ nor beneficial. 
Daes, nevertheless, continued to study the issue independently and eventually 
authored a book, entitled Freedom of the Individual under Law: A Study on the 
Individual’s Duties to the Community and the Limitations on Human Rights and 
Freedoms under Article 29 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which was 
published in 1990 (UNCHR, 1993). 
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2.4.2. The CR Declaration of Human Responsibilities and Duties (1991) 
 
Toward the late 1980s, the CR, a Switzerland-based think tank addressing 
‘global issues’ with a current membership of about one hundred individuals including 
former heads of state or government, began to consider the possibility of creating a 
declaration of human responsibilities and duties (Suter, 2009, 2012:48). At the 1989 
annual CR conference, there was a discussion on the one-dimensional nature of the 
UDHR and a resultant suggestion that there should be a ‘declaration of human rights 
and obligations’ (Suter, 2012:48). 
 
In order to address the issue, Dutch CR member Hans Blauwkuip was 
appointed as head of a CR working group, focusing on ‘human responsibilities’, 
which were understood as individuals’ responsibilities, rather than those of 
organisations or governments (Suter, 2012:48). The working group presented the 
‘Declaration of Human Responsibilities and Duties’ at the 1991 CR Annual 
Conference in Punta del Este, Uruguay (Suter, 2012:48; Tough, 1993:14). The 
declaration emphasises individuals’ duties and responsibilities toward ‘children’, 
‘disabled’ persons, the ‘natural environment’ and the ‘dissemination’ of ‘information’ 
and ‘knowledge’ (CR, 2005:17; Tough, 1993:14). The document, which had not been 
written in the ‘style’ of a UN declaration, essentially was a proposal favouring the 
drafting of such a declaration (Suter, 2012:48). Later that year, the declaration was 
proposed to the UNSG as a complementary text to the UHDR, inviting the UN to 
‘further’ the study begun by the CR (2005:17) (Suter, 2012:48). Although the 
document was ‘circulated’ to the relevant bodies of the UN, it was not considered 
relevant at the time (Suter, 2012:48). 
 
Nonetheless, the CR has continued to promote the adoption of a declaration 
of human responsibilities, while not creating a large-scale campaign advocating for 
the idea (Suter, 2012:48). While members of the CR have advocated for a ‘renewed 
attention’ to the establishment of global ethical standards and for the creation of a 
declaration of ‘global ethics’, others have focused on promoting increased ‘civic 
responsibility’ and on developing ‘common standards’ for environmental and social 
protection, founded on an acknowledgement of common responsibility ‘toward future 
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generations’ (CR, 2005:22-23; Suter, 2012:48). Furthermore, Sydney-based British 
academic and international affairs commentator Keith Suter (1948– ), who has been 
a member of the CR since 1993, has continued to advocate for human 
responsibilities and has sought Western support through his public presentations on 
the subject in Australia and while lecturing in the United States (US) (Suter, 1999, 
2009, 2012:48). He also authored an article on the subject of human responsibilities, 
which was published in 2012 (Suter, 2012).  
 
 
2.4.3. The IAC Universal Declaration of Human Responsibilities (1997) 
 
The IAC (2013), a Tokyo-based independent commission with a membership 
originally comprising about thirty former heads of government or state, acting in their 
personal capacities, has had an enduring ‘objective’ of seeking to ‘balance’ human 
rights with human responsibilities (McGregor, 2013:9; Petrasek & Takahashi, 
1999:10; Steiner & Alston, 2000:351; Suter, 2012; UNCHR, 2002a:22). The 
membership of the IAC later was extended to include other high-ranking ‘politicians’, 
‘academics’, ‘journalists’ and senior religious figures (UNCHR, 2002a:22). Arguing 
that the world ultimately would be ‘unequal’, ‘dangerous’ and ‘discordant’ if 
individuals claimed rights while not acknowledging responsibilities, the late Japanese 
Prime Minister (PM) Takeo Fukuda (1905–1995) and former German Chancellor 
Helmut Schmidt (1918– ) founded the IAC in 1983 (Giacomazzi, 2005:170; Steiner & 
Alston, 2000:351). 
 
Members of the IAC (2013) soon began to explore existing commonalities 
among human ethical standards worldwide and began to draft a declaration of 
‘global ethical standards’ in 1987 (Giacomazzi, 2005:164). In February 1989, Hans 
Küng (1928– ) (1993:45), a Swiss Catholic priest, theologian and member of the IAC, 
addressed the idea at a colloquium at UNESCO in Paris. The following year, his 
book, entitled Global Responsibility was published (Küng, 1993:46). In September, 
1993, at the Parliament of the World’s Religions (PWR) in Chicago, a few hundred 
‘religious leaders’ agreed on the ‘existence’ of a common ‘global ethic’ and adopted 
the ‘Declaration toward a Global Ethic’ (Bell, 1994:21; IAC, 1996; Küng, 1993; 
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Robra, 2000:472). After this event, members of the IAC were ‘encouraged’ by the 
finding that certain ‘ethical standards’ were common to all political ideologies and 
religions worldwide (Giacomazzi, 2005:170). 
 
In April, 1997, the IAC (1997) endorsed a declaration of human 
responsibilities, which was the product of the collective efforts of experts and 
advisors, including journalists and academics such as Küng (1993) and American 
Professor of Catholic Thought and Interreligious Dialogue Leonard Swidler (1929– ) 
(2007) (McGregor, 2013:9-10; Suter, 2012; UNCHR, 2002a:22). Their suggestions 
were offered to the IAC, and the declaration was approved at a session chaired by 
Schmidt, who, at the time, was heading the IAC, together with former Australian PM 
Malcolm Fraser (1930– ) (UNCHR, 2002a:22). The IAC Declaration is arranged in 
five sections, covering a range of themes, including ‘non-violence’, ‘justice’, 
‘solidarity’, ‘truthfulness’, ‘tolerance’ and ‘mutual respect’ (IAC, 1997; Giacomazzi, 
2005:170). Composed of nineteen articles, the document ‘explicitly’ was presented 
as a ‘supplement’ and ‘complement’ to the UDHR (AI, 1998:1; IAC, 1996; IAC, 1997; 
IAC, 1998; McGregor, 2013:10; Petrasek & Takahashi, 1999:11; Suter, 2012; 
UNCHR, 2002a:22). 
 
Following the completion of the drafting of the IAC Declaration, the IAC (1997) 
published and proposed the document on September 1, 1997 (AI, 1998:1; 
Giacomazzi, 2005:164; McGregor, 2013:9; Suter, 2012). At that time, the IAC sent 
the text to all heads of state and government and to the UNSG, requesting that they 
endorse the adoption of the declaration by the UNGA (AI, 1998:1; McGregor, 
2013:10; Petrasek & Takahashi, 1999:10). The stated ‘intention’ was for the UNGA 
to adopt the declaration at its 1998 session, in order to ‘coincide’ with the ‘fiftieth 
anniversary’ of its ‘adoption’ of the UDHR (Giacomazzi, 2005:165; IAC, 1996, 1997, 
1998; McGregor, 2013:10; Petrasek & Takahashi, 1999:11; UNCHR, 2002a:22). The 
UNSG referred the IAC Declaration to the relevant bodies and specialised agencies 
of the UN (AI, 1998:1; McGregor, 2013:10). The IAC Declaration, also, was 
considered at UNESCO and at the UNCHR for ‘potential adoption’ by the UNGA, but 
it was not given ‘sufficient’ support by member-states, and a ‘formal vote’, thus, was 
not considered necessary (Giacomazzi, 2005:164; McGregor, 2013:10). Therefore, 
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the UNGA neither adopted nor considered the declaration its 1998 session, as 
intended by the IAC.  
 
On March 20-21, 1998, at the ‘Preparatory Meeting for the Sixteenth Plenary 
Session’ of the IAC (IAC), also referred to as the ‘Steering Meeting on the 
Dissemination of the Universal Declaration of Human Responsibilities’ (Steering 
Meeting), which took place in Frankfurt, Germany, and was chaired by Fraser, it was 
noted that responses to the IAC had been ‘mixed’ and ‘wide-ranging’ (Giacomazzi, 
2005:164-165; UNCHR, 2002a:23). While the majority of Asian governments readily 
embraced it, most Western governments were ‘reluctant’ to entertain the proposal 
and regarded it with suspicion (Giacomazzi, 2005:165; IAC, 1998). There was 
opposition from the Western media, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights 
(UNHCHR), prominent academics and Western human rights activists and NGOs, 
including AI (1998) and the ICJ (Clapham, 1998; Robinson, 1998a:120; UNCHR, 
2002a:23). The IAC (1998) decided that, without the likelihood of ‘support’ by 
Western governments, it was necessary to defer the proposed submission of the 
declaration to the UNGA for adoption that year (Giacomazzi, 2005:165). The original 
objective to have the declaration adopted at the Fifty-Third Session of the UNGA in 
1998, thus, was ‘modified’ to having it ‘discussed’ at the UN during that session 
(Giacomazzi, 2005:165; IAC, 1998; McGregor, 2013:10; UNCHR, 2002a:22). 
 
Although the IAC Declaration was not an official item on the agenda of the 
UNGA (1998b) at its Fifty-Third Session, Singaporean diplomat Kishore Mahbubani    
(1948– ) did give attention to the document on December 10, 1998, the fiftieth 
anniversary of the adoption of the UDHR. He noted the recommendation by the IAC 
to have the declaration discussed that day (UNGA, 1998b). Questioning the reasons 
and motives behind the decision not to discuss the declaration and finding the 
situation ‘puzzling’, Mahbubani claimed to be aware of surreptitious intrigues to avert 
such a discussion from taking place (UNGA, 1998b). Since that time, various 
governments have been ‘willing’ to ‘co-sponsor’ the IAC Declaration at the UN, on 
the condition that a ‘major Western government’ would be ‘involved’, but such 
Western support has been lacking (McGregor, 2013:10). Nevertheless, the IAC has 
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continued to advocate for the declaration, still recommending that governments 
should sponsor it at the UN (McGregor, 2013:10; Suter, 2012:49). 
 
 
2.4.4. The ICHD Trieste Declaration of Human Duties (1997) 
 
The ICHD, an international NGO with a membership of about eighty 
individuals from all continents, was founded, following the proposal in 1991 by Nobel 
laureate Professors Roger Sperry (1913–1994) and Rita Levi-Montalcini (1909-2012) 
to formulate a ‘Carta of Human Duties’ as a ‘necessary counterpart’ to the UDHR 
(Benatar, 2001:371; ICHD, 2013). Two years later, the ICHD (2013) was established 
at the University of Trieste, at which time a number of scientists, scholars, Nobel 
laureates and Italian and international NGOs began to collaborate to draft the 
envisioned ‘Carta of Human Duties’. The resultant culmination of their efforts led to 
the completion in 1997 of the ‘Declaration of Human Duties’, which came to be 
known as the ‘Trieste Declaration’ (Benatar, 2001:371; ICHD, 2013). 
 
The Trieste Declaration, which was conceptualised as a code of ethics and 
shared responsibilities, lists twelve duties of individuals, including the duty to respect 
human dignity and ethnic, cultural and religious diversity, duties of non-discrimination 
and social equality and duties regarding the regulation of world population growth, 
environmental preservation and non-violence (ICHD, 2013). ‘Among’ the ‘objectives’ 
of the ICHD (2013) were the advancement of international comprehension of the 
concept of ‘human duties’ and the encouragement of the endorsement by the UNGA 
of a universal declaration of human duties, which is envisioned as having 
‘comparable stature’ to the UDHR (Benatar, 2001:371).  
 
In order to realise these goals, the ICHD (2013) applied for NGO consultative 
status with ECOSOC. Building on Article 71 of the UN Charter, ECOSOC 
established NGO ‘consultative status’ in order to provide NGOs with access to 
ECOSOC and its subsidiary bodies, the human rights mechanisms of the UN, as well 
as to special events organised by the President of the UNGA (Hovey, 1997:216; 
NGO Branch, 2013; UN, 1945; Zettler, 2009:3). These NGOs may ‘request’ that 
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particular issues be ‘placed’ on the agendas of ‘relevant’ UN bodies, offer ‘written 
statements’ and give ‘oral presentations’ at sessions and ‘meetings’ (Steiner & 
Alston, 2000:980).  
 
After a lengthy process, the ICHD (2013), eventually, was granted special 
consultative status with ECOSOC in 1997 (Zettler, 2009:6). According to guidelines 
set by ECOSOC (2013), special consultative status NGOs are required to submit to 
the Committee on NGOs a ‘quadrennial report’, a brief report on their activities, 
specifically on the contributions that they have given to the work of the UN. This 
quadrennial review exercise is intended to monitor the relationship between the UN 
and the NGOs in consultative status with ECOSOC (2013). Since 2008, ECOSOC 
(2010) has taken measures to suspend NGOs that fail to submit their reports on time 
and in 2010 decided to withdraw consultative status of NGOs with continued 
outstanding quadrennial reports. These decisions by ECOSOC (2009a:102, 2009b, 
2010a, 2010b:2, 2010c:3) led to the withdrawal of the ICHD’s consultative status with 
the Council, due to a backlog of outstanding quadrennial reports. 
 
By the time that the ICHD obtained special NGO consultative status with 
ECOSOC, Sperry had passed away three years earlier, and Levi-Montalcini was in 
her late eighties. Arguably, the waning presence of these political entrepreneurs at 
the ICHD had had some effect on the motivation of the membership of the 
organisation to pursue its original objectives. Furthermore, even having obtained 
special NGO consultative status, the ICHD likely would have had limited 
opportunities to advocate for its proposed ideals. Indeed, as the number of NGOs in 
consultative status grows, the ‘value’ of having such ‘status’ is actually diminishing, 
as there simply is insufficient time to permit all NGOs to make statements (Steiner & 
Alston, 2000:980; Zettler, 2009:8).  
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2.4.5. The UNESCO-Sponsored Declaration on the Responsibilities of  
the Present Generations toward Future Generations (1997) 
 
Like ECOSOC, UNESCO (1948) has had a protracted history of addressing 
the relationships among human rights, responsibilities, duties and obligations. 
UNESCO (1948) was involved in providing comments and interpretations on human 
rights during the drafting of the UDHR. Furthermore, in 1982 UNESCO published a 
study, entitled ‘Historical Foundations of Human Rights and Subsequent 
Developments’, in which it noted the lacking definition of the ‘duties to the 
community’ under the UDHR and the International Covenants on Human Rights 
(UNCHR, 2002a:27). Seven years later, in February, 1989, UNESCO hosted a 
colloquium in Paris, at which Küng (1993:45) presented a paper on global ethics. 
 
In 1994 another initiative considering individuals’ duties emerged at UNESCO 
(Giacomazzi, 2005:171; UNCHR, 2002a:14). Realising the rights of ‘future 
generations’, it was proposed that a declaration was needed to assign duties to 
‘each generation’ in order to safeguard the rights of future generations (Giacomazzi, 
2005:171). UNESCO, in collaboration with the Cousteau Society, hosted a meeting, 
which took place on February 25-26, 1994, at the University of La Laguna in 
Tenerife, Spain (Giacomazzi, 2005:171; UNESCO, 1994). At the meeting, experts 
from across the world adopted the ‘Universal Declaration of Human Rights for Future 
Generations’, which came to be referred to as the ‘La Laguna Declaration’ 
(UNESCO, 1994). The declaration was presented to the Executive Board of 
UNESCO (1994:3) on September 22, 1994.  
 
Encouraged by the positive responses of members of the Executive Board, 
the Director-General of UNESCO (1994:2), then, referred the document to the UNSG 
and the UNHCHR. Having requested views of experts from across the world, the 
Director-General of UNESCO (1994:2) received several responses in favour of the 
adoption by UNESCO of a ‘declaration on the rights of future generations’, which 
could be regarded as particularly significant on the occasion of the ‘fiftieth 
anniversary’ of the establishment of the UN and UNESCO the following year. The 
declaration was revised in consideration of such recommendations (UNESCO, 
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1997b). These efforts led, eventually, to the adoption of the ‘Declaration on the 
Responsibilities of the Present Generations toward Future Generations’ on 
November 12, 1997, at the Twenty-Ninth Session of the General Conference of 
UNESCO in Paris (Clapham, 1998; UNCHR, 2002a:14). However, the declaration 
was not further addressed by other relevant bodies of the UN and, ultimately, was 
not adopted by the UNGA.  
 
 
2.4.6. The UNESCO-Sponsored Valencia Declaration of Human Duties and  
Responsibilities (1998) 
 
A number of months before the adoption by UNESCO of ‘the Declaration on 
the Responsibilities of the Present Generations toward Future Generations’ (1997), 
members of UNESCO proposed, also, a ‘universal declaration of human 
responsibilities’ (Giacomazzi, 2005:171). On March 20-28, 1997, a number of 
philosophers of various religious, ethnic and ethical backgrounds, met at UNESCO 
(1997a) in order to draft a declaration, which would provide a philosophical 
foundation for a ‘global ethic’. The declaration was proposed by the ‘Valencia 
Foundation for the Third Millennium’ and the ‘ADC New Millennium Association’ 
(UNESCO, 1997a). The original intention for the declaration was to present it to 
member-states of UNESCO (1999) and, ultimately, to the UNGA for adoption, in 
order that it might strengthen observance of the UDHR. The declaration was drafted 
by a ‘group’ of experts from over a hundred states, chaired by former South African 
Justice Richard Goldstone, under the sponsorship of UNESCO (1997a, 1999) and 
Valencia, Spain (Hunt, 2001:180; McGregor, 2013:11). 
 
In 1998 the declaration, which came to be known as the ‘Valencia 
Declaration’, was adopted in Valencia by seventy-five prominent individuals from 
across the world (Hunt, 2001:180; McGregor, 2013:11; UNESCO, 1999). As was the 
intention of the IAC for its declaration, the publishing of the Valencia Declaration 
originally was timed to ‘coincide’ with the fiftieth anniversary of the adoption by the 
UNGA of the UDHR (McGregor, 2013:11). The Valencia Declaration, eventually, was 
presented to UNESCO Director-General Federico Mayor on April 28, 1999 and was 
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envisioned to commemorate the arrival of the millennium (McGregor, 2013:11; 
UNESCO, 1999). 
 
Goldstone was cited in November, 2008, as explaining that the declaration 
was not adopted by UNESCO, nor was it adopted by any other body of the UN 
(McGregor, 2013:11-12). Nevertheless, in November of the following year, the 
Madrid-based ‘Helsinki España-Human Dimension’ NGO hosted a conference in 
New York, in order to celebrate the ‘tenth anniversary’ of the adoption of the 
Valencia Declaration, and  participants at the ‘international sessions’ purposed to 
‘resubmit’ the Valencia Declaration to the UN in 2010 (McGregor, 2013:12). An 
inquiry sent in 2013, questioning the development of such efforts, received no 
response (McGregor, 2013:12). 
 
 
2.4.7. The UNCHR-Commissioned Study on Human Rights and Human  
Responsibilities (2003) 
 
During the remaining five years of its existence, the UNCHR, which in 2006 
was substituted with the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC), focused specifically 
on the relationship between human rights and human responsibilities (McGregor, 
2013:13). The UNCHR was founded by ECOSOC in 1946, in order to serve as the 
principal organ of the UN for human rights (Alvarez, 2005:435; Chesterman et al., 
2008:448). Contrary to many other ‘mechanisms’ of ‘human rights compliance’, 
which comprise of ‘experts’ assigned in their ‘personal capacities’, the membership 
of the UNCHR comprised of fifty-three ‘government representatives’, elected with 
consideration given to ‘regional representation’ (Alvarez, 2005:435).  
 
In April 2000, the LMG, an alliance of traditionally non-democratic, developing 
states acting as a negotiating block at the UN, set the issue of human responsibilities 
on the agenda of the UNCHR (2003b:1), despite opposition from Western 
delegations (Sceats & Breslin, 2012:9; Stanley, 1998; UN Watch, 2007:6, 17). 
Adopted by one vote, the UNCHR adopted a decision requesting the Sub-
Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights to conduct a study 
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on human rights and human responsibilities (UNHCHR, 2000b). On August 18, 
2000, the Sub-Commission adopted a controversial decision to appoint its Cuban 
member and LMG representative, Martínez, to undertake the study and to submit to 
the UNCHR (2002a:1) a preliminary report in 2002 and a final report in 2003 (Knox, 
2008:35-36; UNHCHR, 2000a). Despite ‘opposition’ from delegacies representing 
Western states and particularly those of the EU, on July 24, 2001, Martínez was 
‘appointed’ by ECOSOC (2001) as UNSR at the request of the UNCHR and its Sub-
Commission (UNCHR, 2005a:36). 
 
On March 19, 2002, Martínez presented the Preliminary Report on Human 
Rights and Human Responsibilities to the UNCHR (2002a:1). He had included a 
‘questionnaire’ to be sent to UN member-states and ‘relevant’ NGOs, in order to 
assess the contemporary positions of an array of state and non-state actors on the 
issue (UNCHR, 2002a:19, 32). Martínez, also, had proposed a number of research 
field trips to Africa, Asia and Europe, which he deemed ‘necessary’ for his study 
(ECOSOC, 2002). After two days of discussion on the Preliminary Report, the 
UNCHR referred it to ECOSOC for consideration (UNHCHR, 2002). ECOSOC 
(2002), again, requested the UNSG to assist Martínez in fulfilling effectively his 
‘mandate’.  
 
The questionnaire was sent to the requested state parties, and, later in 2002, 
Martínez completed his intended research field missions (UNCHR, 2003b:2). In 
reviewing the responses to the questionnaire, he noted the lack of responses from 
NGOs and, after inquiring into the matter, discovered the possibility that the Office of 
the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) may have failed to send the 
questionnaire to them (UNCHR, 2003b:2). While the number of governmental 
responses admittedly was relatively low, they reflected a clear division between the 
developed states of the Global North, whose responses opposed the formal 
correlation between the rights and responsibilities of individuals, and developing 
states of the South, whose replies acknowledged such a correlation (UNCHR, 
2003b:2-3). Polarisation on the issue also was evident in discussions during working 
visits to Brussels and Madrid and with representatives of governmental officials and 
civil society members in Asia and Africa (UNCHR, 2003b:3). 
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On March 17, 2003, Martínez presented the Final Report on Human Rights 
and Human Responsibilities to the UNCHR (2003b:1). Considering the suggestion 
made by Daes in 1982, regarding the need for a declaration on the responsibilities of 
individuals, and inspired by the initiative advocating for the adoption by the UNGA of 
the IAC Declaration, Martínez drafted the DHSR, which he attached to the Final 
Report (UNCHR, 2002a:13; 2003b:20-26). On April 21, 2004, the Chinese and 
Cuban delegates, on behalf of the LMG, expressed support for the eventual adoption 
by the UNGA of the DHSR and called for a resolution, which, adopted by one vote, 
requested the OHCHR to compile views of states, intergovernmental organisations 
(IGOs) and NGOs on the DHSR (UNCHR, 2004b:82-83, 2005a).  
 
On July 22, 2004, at the Annual Substantive Session of ECOSOC, the 
delegate of the Netherlands, on behalf of the EU, expressed firm opposition to the 
resolution and presented a draft decision at ECOSOC (2004), seeking to ‘overturn’ 
the decision of the UNCHR (2004b:82-83) (EU, 2004; UN Information Service, 
2004). However, the draft decision was rejected by one vote (ECOSOC, 2004). After 
forwarding the DHSR to all requested parties on August, 3-4, 2004, the OHCHR 
received twenty-seven responses from governments, two from IGOs and one from 
an NGO (UNCHR, 2004a, 2004b, 2005a:36). The replies were ‘overwhelmingly 
opposed’ to the DHSR, and only two states, namely Cuba and China, supported it 
(UNCHR, 2005a:36). 
 
On April 20, 2005, at the final meeting of the UNCHR, the Chinese delegate, 
on behalf of the LGM, introduced another resolution, this time requesting Martínez to 
revise the DHSR, taking into consideration the deliberations at the UNCHR (2005a, 
2005b:15, 2005c:15, 341) and the comments documented by the OHCHR, 
concerning the DHSR (UN, 2005). ECOSOC (2005) initially endorsed the decision 
for Martínez to revise the DHSR (UNCHR, 2005c:15, 341). However, three months 
later, at the Annual Substantive Session of ECOSOC (2005a) on July 25, 2005, the 
delegate of the United Kingdom (UK), on behalf of the EU, called for a vote to 
reconsider the proposal to further the study on human rights and human 
responsibilities (EU, 2005). ECOSOC (2005a) rejected, by two votes, the proposal, 
thus formally discontinuing the development of the DHSR. 
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Since the replacement of the UNCHR by the UNHRC in 2006, the issue of 
human responsibilities has not featured on the agenda of the new UN body 
(McGregor, 2013:13). Nevertheless, the DHSR still is supported by a number of 
states, and it is likely that its advocates will ‘continue’ to lobby for the endorsement of 
its ‘principles’ in some ‘form’ (Knox, 2008:1; McGregor, 2013:13). However, since 
Martínez passed away in February, 2010, a new ‘political entrepreneur’ willing to 
assume the challenge of devoting significant attention to the issue would need to 
emerge at the UNHRC. To date, this has not been the case. Furthermore, while 
drafting the ‘Preliminary Study on Promoting Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms through a Better Understanding of Traditional Values of Humankind’ in 
May, 2012, the drafting group of the Advisory Committee of the UNHRC noted that 
ECOSOC in 2005 had voted against a proposal to develop the DHSR, due to views 
expressed by numerous states that human rights are ‘inalienable’ and inherent in 
each person and that a focus on individual responsibilities could undermine the 
universality of human rights (EU, 2005; UNHRC, 2012:10). It, thus, appears that this 
perspective has become fairly dominant within the UNHRC (UNHRC, 2010:10). 
 
 
2.5. Opportunities and Strategies adopted by Transnational Campaigns for  
       Human Responsibilities 
 
In order to understand the choices, strategies and political outcomes of 
advocacy initiatives for human responsibilities, it is necessary to take into account 
the political and cultural contexts in which they emerged. The outcomes of 
transnational campaigns cannot be explained in isolation, as contextual factors, to 
some extent, shape the opportunities available to them. Political opportunities, 
comprising the ‘relatively stable’ structural features of the international system, as 
well as the ‘more volatile’ features, therefore, should be considered (Meyer & 
Staggenborg, 1996:1634).  
 
While ‘relatively stable’ features, such as institutional access and UN 
procedures, have limited the possibilities and opportunities available to advocates for 
human responsibilities, the actions of these advocates and their opponents further 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 T
ow
n
34 
 
have facilitated and constrained the possibilities for change and political action 
(Meyer & Staggenborg, 1996:1634). Institutional strategies have involved having to 
adapt to the norms and practices specific to ‘particular venues’, when adopting 
customary ‘channels of influence’ (Meyer & Staggenborg, 1996:1650). For instance, 
the ICHD, employing a ‘structural’ tactic, had to comply with institutional regulations, 
by applying for NGO consultative status with ECOSOC in order to gain access to the 
sessions and meetings of the various UN bodies.  
 
As the ‘relative’ permissiveness, of the international political opportunity 
structure ‘generally’ remains ‘stable’, advocates for human responsibilities perceive 
fluctuating opportunities, dependent, ultimately, on alterations to policy (Busby, 
2007:252; Meyer & Staggenborg, 1996:1636). An issue seldom ‘closes’ with an initial 
‘outcome’, such as the introduction of ‘legislation’, and issues involving dissentious 
value conflicts, in particular, are likely to be ongoing (Meyer & Staggenborg, 
1996:1636). Indeed, the lengthy debate over the extent to which individuals should 
bear responsibilities or duties for the fulfilment of human rights under international 
human rights law has emerged and re-emerged at various times, while remaining 
less prominent at other times.  
 
Despite the dominant focus of international human rights law on the 
obligations of states as prime in protecting human rights, changes in public policy, 
political discourse and elite alignment at various times have affected the ‘perceived 
openness’ of the issue of human responsibilities (Clapham, 1998; Hammarberg, 
1999:i; Meyer & Staggenborg, 1996:1634). The following section seeks to 
demonstrate the ways in which the perceived ‘openness’ on the issue of human 
responsibilities influenced both the opportunities available to its proponents and the 
strategies that they chose to adopt (Meyer & Staggenborg, 1996:1636). 
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2.5.1. The Post-Cold War Context and the Emergence of the ‘Asian Values’  
Argument  
 
A number of transnational campaigns advocating for human responsibilities 
began to emerge toward the late 1980s, coinciding with the end of the CW, and 
became particularly prominent during the 1990s. At this time, advocates for human 
responsibilities, therefore, perceived the international political opportunity structure to 
be permissive, and even favourable, to the issue. During the early 1990s, the end of 
the CW had led to increased optimism that the UN would assume a more prominent 
role in the promotion of human rights protection, and the adoption in 1993 of the 
VDPA had strengthened this perspective (Chesterman et al., 2008:470). 
 
While many view the ‘concept’ and ‘rhetoric’ of human rights as 
‘unproblematic’, as fundamental to a ‘universal discourse’ concerning ‘human dignity’ 
and ‘humane’ conduct by governments toward individuals, others, conversely, regard 
the dominant ‘discourse’ on rights as foreign and detrimental to their ‘states’, ‘social 
structures’ and cultural traditions (Steiner & Alston, 2000:323). Cultural relativists 
contend that international human rights legal instruments and their claims to 
universality suggest the ‘cultural imperialist’ stance of Western states and that such 
‘universalisation of norms’ impairs cultural ‘diversity’ and leads to ‘cultural 
homogenisation’ (Steiner & Alston, 2000:267).  
 
During the CW, such universal-relativist debates, which often amounted to 
routine ‘highly politicised accusations’, primarily took place between Communist 
states, as well as their affiliates, and Western democracies (Steiner & Alston, 
2000:267). While Western democracies accused Communist states of abusing many 
fundamental rights, particularly civil and political rights, these states responded both 
by accusing the West with violations of ‘social’ and ‘economic’ rights and by affirming 
that Communist states were based on different ‘political’ and ‘ideological’ traditions 
regarding rights (Steiner & Alston, 2000:267-268).  
 
Although the debate between Western and Communist states lost its impact 
toward the end of the CW, a number of its ‘themes’ have emerged in a ‘universal-
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relative debate’, involving an increasing number of ‘non-state actors’, but occurring 
primarily between ‘developed’ Northern, or Western, states and ‘less developed’ 
Southern states, or between Western and Islamic states (Steiner & Alston, 
2000:268). Indeed, during the early 1990s, such a claim that human rights are not 
reflective of ‘Asian values’ emerged (Berthrong, 2003:199; Clapham, 1998; Korey, 
1998:469). Proponents of this view questioned the validity and universality of the 
UDHR (Clapham, 1998; Korey, 1998:469; “Madeleine Albright Sings Out”, 1997).  
 
At the Regional Meeting for Asia of the World Conference on Human Rights, 
which took place from March 29 to April 2, 1993 in Bangkok, Thailand, a number of 
Asian governments adopted the ‘Bangkok Declaration’ (1993), by which 
representatives of Asian states dismissed civil and political rights as contrary to 
‘Asian values’ (Føllesdal, 2003:1; UNGA, 1993b). The Bangkok Declaration, which 
contains a number of criticisms of human rights, including the relativist claim that an 
emphasis on human rights ‘ignores’ or ‘detracts’ from individuals’ duties, received 
considerable attention, particularly, as it was adopted immediately before the 
VWCHR (Føllesdal, 2003:1-2; UNGA, 1993b).  
 
Four years later, in 1997, Economic Advisor to the Malaysian Government 
Tun Daim Zainuddin, purporting that the membership of the UN had grown from forty 
to over 180 member-states since the adoption of the UDHR, argued, therefore, that it 
was necessary to render the UDHR ‘relevant’ to contemporary times and to render it 
‘acceptable’ to nations and individuals worldwide (Clapham, 1998). The night before 
the UN began to prepare for ‘fiftieth anniversary ceremonies’ of the UDHR, which 
would take place throughout the year of 1998, the US and other Western states, 
thus, were confronted by a Southeast Asian bloc of states, who questioned the 
‘validity’ and ‘universality’ of the UDHR and called for a ‘revision’ of the document 
(Korey, 1998:469). 
 
At the Fifty-Third Session of the UNGA (1998b) Mahbubani professed support 
for the IAC Declaration and claimed that the emphasis of Western states on ‘rights’, 
rather than ‘responsibilities’, had produced a ‘culture of permissiveness’ and ‘social 
issues’, which are considered with contempt by societies that are more ‘traditional’. 
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Claiming that the notion of ‘responsibility’ underlines the world’s ‘major faiths’ and 
‘value systems’ and raising the idea of balancing human rights with responsibilities, 
he argued that ‘double standards’ were reflected in the drafting of the UDHR and 
have endured in contemporary times (UNGA, 1998b).  
 
It has been argued that, until the late 1980s, authoritarian states in East and 
South East Asia had sought to justify violations of civil and political rights within their 
jurisdictions on the basis of communist ideas, therefore perceiving to be immune 
from international scrutiny of their authoritarian political systems, but that the end of 
the CW had brought an end to such perceived immunity, and universal claims on 
human rights, thus, came to be regarded as the imposition of Western norms 
(Clapham, 1998). Fearing the consequences of international human rights law on 
their competitiveness in the framework of international trade, brought about by 
economic globalisation, these states, arguably, claimed to detect in the emphasis on 
human rights a ‘Western conspiracy’ to undermine newly developing economies 
(Clapham, 1998). 
 
The cultural relativist ‘Asian values’ argument challenging the legitimacy, 
validity, relevance and universality of human rights, arguably, created the perception 
of a more ‘permissive’ international political opportunity structure, favouring 
transnational advocacy efforts for human responsibilities (Berthrong, 2003:199; 
Busby, 2007:252; Clapham, 1998; Korey, 1998:469; Meyer & Staggenborg, 
1996:1636). It is likely that initiatives for human responsibilities benefited from this 
Post-CW climate of criticism of universal human rights and the accompanying 
renewed focus on ‘Asian values’ and preference of individuals’ responsibilities over 
rights (Berthrong, 2003:199; Clapham, 1998; Korey, 1998:469).  
 
Indeed, a number of transnational campaigns for human responsibilities 
adopted an explicit stance regarding the issue of ‘Asian values’ or the ‘Asian concept 
of human rights’ (Clapham, 1998; IAC, 2008; Korey, 1998:469). For instance, the 
IAC (1998) has asserted that, while the UDHR reveals the ‘cultural’ and 
‘philosophical’ traditions of the Western victors at the close of WWII, the IAC 
Declaration is envisioned to revive concepts of ‘responsibility’ and ‘community’, 
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characteristic of Eastern traditions (Clapham, 1998). In turn, this study portrays that, 
while Western actors generally rejected the claims of human responsibilities 
initiatives, Asian states typically were amongst their strongest supporters 
(Giacomazzi, 2005:165; IAC, 1998; UNGA, 1998b). Indeed, Mahbubani made 
mention of the IAC Declaration at the UNGA (1998b), and a number of Asian 
governments, since, have expressed a ‘willingness’ to ‘co-sponsor’ the document at 
the UN (IAC, 1998; McGregor, 2013:10).  
 
Furthermore, a number of LMG delegates at the UNCHR have offered 
relativist objections to the concept and practice of human rights. Indeed, during the 
2004 session of the UNCHR, a number of LMG states, such as Cuba and various 
developing Islamic, African and Asian states, contended that Western democracies 
tended to politicise their ‘criticism’ of other states’ ‘human rights performances’, to 
place greater emphasis on ‘civil’ and ‘political rights’ than on ‘economic’ and 
‘development rights’ and to inflict Western ‘cultural standards’ and ‘governmental 
systems’ on other states (UN Information Service, 2004). Moreover, a number of 
Asian states, most notably including China as a member of the LMG, were amongst 
the strongest supporters of the DHSR at the UNCHR during the early 2000s 
(Yishanat, 2004; UNCHR, 2005a:37). The LMG emphasised a need to balance 
Western notions of rights with the idea of the individual responsibility, reflected in 
cultures, including those of Asian states (UNCHR, 2005a:37). Thus, human 
responsibilities initiatives used the opportunity brought about by the ‘Asian values’ 
claim to strengthen political alignments regarding the issue of human responsibilities 
and to raise its public profile and salience. 
 
 
2.5.2. The Debate on the Duties of Individuals while Drafting the Declaration on  
Human Rights Defenders (1998) 
 
Another opportunity created by advocates for human responsibilities to 
strengthen ‘political alignments’ concerning the issue and to raise its ‘public profile’ 
and ‘salience’ occurred during the drafting of the DHRD (Clapham, 1998; Knox, 
2008:35; Meyer & Staggenborg, 1996:1634; UNCHR, 1993; UNGA, 1998a). Creating 
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an opportunity through a contentious discussion at a working group drafting the 
DHRD in 1993, LMG delegates advocated for the inclusion, within the text of the 
declaration, a clarification on individuals’ duties under the IBR (UNCHR, 1993). 
Delegates representing the LMG used the opportunity to advocate for a greater 
emphasis on individuals’ responsibilities under international human rights law (Knox, 
2008:35; UNCHR, 1993).  
 
At the working group in 1993, the lines of political alignment, regarding the 
issue of human responsibilities, became evident, as proponents of human 
responsibilities had become assured that they had strong support within the LMG 
concerning the issue (UNCHR, 1993). Future advocates for the DHSR, particularly 
Chinese and Cuban delegations including Cuban delegate Martínez, had found 
sympathetic partners and allies, thus achieving a key stage of interceding for the 
issue (Hovey, 1997:216; Knox, 2008:35; UNCHR, 1993). It also became clear who, 
later, would oppose the initiatives, not only of the LMG to advocate for human 
responsibilities, but also that of the IAC (UNCHR, 1993). At the working group in 
1993, Western delegations and observers representing human rights organisations 
such as AI and the ICJ, voiced strong opposition to the views on human 
responsibilities raised by LMG delegates (UNCHR, 1993). The contentious debate 
on the role of rights and responsibilities at the working group, arguably, altered the 
political opportunity structure on the issue of human responsibilities, and the 
perceived ‘window of opportunity’, later, led the LMG to advocate for the adoption by 
the UNGA of the DHSR (Meyer & Staggenborg, 1996:1634-1635). 
 
 
2.5.3. Focusing Events employed by Advocates for Human Responsibilities 
 
A number of initiatives advocating for human responsibilities, including those 
of the IAC and UNESCO, raised the ‘public profile’ and ‘salience’ of the issue of 
human responsibilities by magnifying the upcoming international historical event of 
the fiftieth anniversary of the adoption of the UDHR (Busby, 2007:253; Meyer & 
Staggenborg, 1996:1634). Later, UNESCO, similarly, took advantage of the 
upcoming new millennium to refocus attention on the issue of human responsibilities. 
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Advocates for human responsibilities made use of these ‘focusing events’, 
particularly that of the fiftieth anniversary of the adoption of the UDHR, as ‘windows 
of opportunity’ to address supposed deficiencies within the document, by proposing 
that ‘balancing’ human rights with human responsibilities would enhance human 
rights, both theoretically, or conceptually, and practically (Busby, 2007:253; Meyer & 
Staggenborg, 1996:1634).  
 
By exploiting and amplifying this ‘critical event’, thus placing added 
significance on it and influencing the extent to which it would be considered as 
‘momentous’, advocates for human responsibilities forced public ‘attention’ on the 
issue of human responsibilities and, in turn, altered the political opportunities 
available to them (Busby, 2007:253; Meyer & Staggenborg, 1996:1634, 1638). 
International relations theorist Joshua Busby (2007:253) argues that the ‘expiration 
date’ of a transnational campaign, further, can serve to ‘concentrate attention’ on it. 
Thus, by advocating for the adoption of a universal declaration of human 
responsibilities at the 1998 session of the UNGA, timed to coincide with the fiftieth 
anniversary of its adoption of the UDHR, or with the start of the millennium in the 
case of UNESCO, campaigns sought to ‘concentrate attention’ on the issue of 
human responsibilities (Busby, 2007:253). 
 
‘Regularly scheduled’ meetings, such as international conferences, also 
served to focus attention, hence the significance of the successful attempt of the 
ICHD (2013) to obtain special NGO consultative status with ECOSOC in 1997 
(Busby, 2007:253). Similarly, the ‘regularly scheduled’ sessions and meetings of the 
UNCHR, including the 1993 working group that drafted the DHRD, provided 
opportunities for proponents of human responsibilities to raise the issue (Busby, 
2007:253; UNCHR, 1993). Particularly during the period between 2000 and 2005, 
when the issue was on the agenda of the UNCHR, its proponents significantly had 
increased their opportunities to influence fellow decision-makers to develop a policy 
on the issue, thus altering the ‘relative openness’ of the international political 
opportunity structure on the issue (Busby, 2007:252-253; Meyer & Staggenborg, 
1996:1636). 
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2.5.4. Collective Action Frames used by Transnational Campaigns for Human  
Responsibilities 
 
The strategies and ‘tactics’ adopted by human responsibilities initiatives have 
been shaped both by their ‘organisational needs’ and by broader ‘political’ and 
‘cultural’ contextual factors (Meyer & Staggenborg, 1996:1649). Such initiatives have 
encountered ‘institutionally-oriented’ constraints and ‘extra-institutional’ contextual 
limitations, including the ‘polarisation’ of targeted audiences on the issue of human 
responsibilities, thus reflecting the significance of cultural, ideological and value-
based ideas in potentially influencing policy outcomes (EU, 2005; Meyer & 
Staggenborg, 1996:1650; UNCHR, 1993, 2003b:2-3).  
 
The ‘extra-institutional’ tactics used by advocates for human responsibilities 
have included their use of collective action frames to draw attention to the issue of 
human responsibilities (Meyer & Staggenborg, 1996:1650). By framing the issue 
within a particular social setting, advocates attempted to explicate ‘broader social 
meanings’ (Payne, 2001:43). Transnational campaigns for human responsibilities 
commonly have framed the concept of human responsibilities as compatible with and 
supplementary to universal human rights (IAC, 1996, 1997, 1998; Suter, 2012:51). 
Indeed, the overarching objective of these campaigns has been to propose a 
declaration of human responsibilities to ‘complement’ and ‘strengthen’ the UDHR 
(IAC, 1997; Suter, 2012:51).  
 
In order to situate the issue of human responsibilities within a ‘broader social 
and historical setting’, advocates for human responsibilities generally have framed 
the issue as a cultural relativist claim that Western notions of human rights are 
incomplete without human responsibilities and that a dominant focus on human 
rights, ultimately, ‘deemphasises’ duties and responsibilities, which are reflected  in 
alternative cultural traditions and interpretations on human rights (Giacomazzi, 
2005:169-170; Passini, 2011:281; Payne, 2001:43; Steiner & Alston, 2000:335; 
UNCHR, 2003b:11). Such relativists point to the constitutional provisions of various 
states, which give attention not only to rights, but also to individuals’ duties and 
responsibilities, as well as to regional declarations and treaties, such as the ADRDM 
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and the ‘Charter on Human and People’s Rights’, also referred to as the ‘Banjul 
Charter’, of the African Union (formerly the Organisation of African Unity), which was 
adopted on June 27, 1981, and entered into force on  October 21, 1986 (OAS, 1948; 
OAU, 1981; UNCHR, 2002a:17).  
 
These critics contend that domestic law and public discourse of Western 
states, particularly the US, conversely lack the views that each individual owes 
duties to others and that ‘civic’ responsibility should be promoted (Flynn, 2005:252; 
Passini, 2011:281; Steiner & Alston, 2000:335). They argue that rights, particularly 
increased civil rights protections since the 1960s, are at fault (Steiner & Alston, 
2000:335). The issue of human responsibilities, thus, easily could be ‘grafted’ onto 
such ‘pre-existing’ cultural relativist claims, such as the ‘Asian values’ argument 
emerging in the 1990s (Berthrong, 2003:199; Carpenter, 2007:103-104; Clapham, 
1998; Flynn, 2005:245; Korey, 1998:469). 
 
However, due to the stark polarisation in international perspectives on human 
responsibilities, appealing to cultural relativist claims has meant simultaneously 
inviting criticism from Western governments and civil society members, including the 
media and international human rights organisations (IAC, 1998; EU, 2004, 2005; 
Giacomazzi, 2005:165). Thus, not only have these campaigns lacked the necessary 
Western support that they necessarily have sought, but they also have been forced 
to begin their advocacy efforts on the defensive. Since the very emergence of their 
campaigns, they have had to attempt to persuade target audiences of the salience of 
the issue of human responsibilities, while simultaneously having to maintain their 
defence that they do not intend to weaken the UDHR or any other international 
human rights instrument (IAC, 2008). Advocates for human responsibilities have 
faced ‘automatic’ constraints to their political opportunities, as human rights 
defenders have been suspicious that efforts seek to ‘undermine’ and ‘weaken’ the 
international human rights legal framework (AI, 1998:1-5; Clapham, 1998; EU, 2004, 
2005; Meyer & Staggenborg, 1996:1642). 
 
Another common frame used by transnational campaigns for human 
responsibilities has been to define such responsibilities as ‘morally’ binding, rather 
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than ‘legally’ binding (Clapham, 1998; IAC, 1998). For instance, the IAC (1998) has 
attempted to persuade critics that the IAC Declaration is conceptualised as a ‘moral’ 
or ethical ‘appeal’, rather than a document with a direct binding character of 
international law. In his study on human rights and human responsibilities, Martínez 
also referred to the ‘moral’ and ‘ethical’ nature of individuals’ duties and 
responsibilities, as opposed to the legally-binding obligations of states under 
international human rights law (UNCHR, 2002a:9).  
 
While all UN declarations, by nature, are not legally binding, the UDHR, in 
contrast to proposed declarations of human responsibilities, was envisioned as early 
as the 1940s to be the first phase in creating an international human rights legal 
framework, which would assign obligations to states and hold them accountable for 
the protection, promotion and fulfilment of human rights (Conforti, 2005:300; 
Rimmer, 2010:21; Risse & Ropp, 1999:234). Indeed, Knox (2008:32) argues that, 
while the DHSR claims to list ‘moral’, rather than ‘legal’ responsibilities, it was drafted 
in the style of human rights instruments and claims that such responsibilities are 
‘equal’ in ‘value’ and significance to ‘legally’ accepted human rights and that the 
adoption by the UNGA of such a declaration, therefore, could signal the development 
of a ‘legal standard’ on human responsibilities and affect the interpretation of pre-
existing ‘standards’ (Knox, 2008:32). Thus, not only is the envisioning of a UN 
declaration, comprising morally or ethically binding human responsibilities, 
‘inconsistent’ with international human rights law, but also has the ‘potential’ to 
‘undermine’ internationally recognised human rights (Clapham, 1998; EU, 2004, 
2005; Hammarberg, 1999:iii). 
 
Another major inconsistency between proposed universal declarations of 
human responsibilities and international human rights instruments concerns the 
primary actors to which they assign duties, responsibilities or obligations (Clapham, 
1998; Hammarberg, 1999:i). While the approach of advocates for human 
responsibilities typically has been to frame human responsibilities in relation to 
human rights, the more important and, often, less regarded issue is the extent to 
which individuals normatively should bear duties or responsibilities for the fulfilment 
of human rights (Clapham, 1998; Hammarberg, 1999:i; Steiner & Alston, 2000:337). 
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Thus, the main point of contention regarding the issue of human responsibilities 
concerns not the existence and necessity for individual responsibility, but rather the 
primary actors to which obligations for the promotion and protection of human rights 
should be assigned (Clapham, 1998). As the ‘approach’ of international human rights 
law typically has been to assign such obligations to states, proposed declarations of 
human responsibilities have been considered incompatible with the international 
human rights framework (Clapham, 1998; Hammarberg, 1999:i). 
 
Normative claims concerning human responsibilities generally lack ‘legitimacy’ 
in the perspectives of their targeted audiences (AI, 1998:2, 2005:43; Clapham, 1998; 
Florini, 1996:376; Hammarberg, 1999:iii). Drawing on the terminology proposed by 
theorist Thomas Franck, norm evolution theorist Ann Florini (1996:276) argues that 
the ‘legitimacy’ of a new norm depends on its ‘determinacy’ and ‘coherence’. In 
terms of the ‘determinacy’ of claims regarding human responsibilities, proposed 
declarations of human responsibilities contain ‘vague’, unspecific and ‘ill-defined 
concepts’, thus creating ‘confusion’ with regard to their intended adherents, and 
arguably are not applicable to existing standards of ‘justice’ and ‘reason’, by which 
the ‘rule of law’ is regarded as more appropriate (AI, 1998:1-5; Florini, 1996:376; 
IJM, 2013).  
 
With regard to the ‘coherence’ of normative claims regarding human 
responsibilities, the issue, arguably, is not ‘logically’ associated with its ‘principled’ 
function of enhancing human rights protection, nor is it ‘logically’ associated with 
‘principles’ usually adopted to resolve ‘similar’ issues, as the dominant ‘approach’ of 
international human rights law is to assign primary obligations for the fulfilment of 
human rights to states, rather than to individuals (Florini, 1996:376; Giacomazzi, 
2005:173; Hammarberg, 1999:i; Knox, 2008:1). Furthermore, the issue is not 
‘logically related’ to ‘principles’ usually used to solve such problems, as creating a 
UN declaration is not the conventional way to address ‘ethical’ and ‘moral’ issues (AI, 
2005:43; Florini, 1996:376). UN declarations, while not legally binding, are normative 
components of the legal framework of international human rights (Conforti, 2005:300; 
Rimmer, 2010:21; Risse & Ropp, 1999:234). 
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Proposed declarations of human responsibilities do not ‘fit coherently’ with 
‘pre-existing’ international human rights ‘standards’ (Carpenter, 2007:104; Clapham, 
1998; Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:908; Florini, 1996:376-377). Advocates for human 
responsibilities are required effectively to ‘make the case’ that their normative claims 
concerning human responsibilities are either ‘logical extensions’ or ‘necessary’ 
amendments to international human rights law (Florini, 1996:377). However, the 
focus of proposed declarations on ethical or moral duties and responsibilities of 
individuals is not reflective of the traditional ‘approach’ of international human rights 
law, which assigns legal obligations for human rights protection to states (Clapham, 
1998). 
 
 
2.6. The Partial Success of Advocacy Efforts for Human Responsibilities?  
 
While the political outcomes of human responsibilities campaigns have not 
matched their objectives of having a universal declaration of human responsibilities 
adopted by the UNGA, the initiatives addressed by this dissertation, particularly 
those of the IAC and the LMG, arguably, were perceived by their opponents as 
partially successful, as they effectively set the issue of human responsibilities on the 
international agenda (Meyer & Staggenborg, 1996:1644). Successfully generating 
‘political openness’ on the issue of human responsibilities and raising its ‘public 
profile’ and ‘salience’, human responsibilities initiatives gained the ‘attention’ of the 
press and ‘policymakers’, thus opening a ‘policy window’ on the issue and creating 
opportunities for ‘institutional action’ by a number of advocates lobbying for the issue 
(Busby, 2007:252; Meyer & Staggenborg, 1996:1635).   
 
While partial successes for human responsibilities campaigns could have 
served to further their development, by creating ‘tactical opportunities’ and 
anticipation of ‘further success’, opportunities for ‘counter-tactics’, simultaneously, 
emerged (Meyer & Staggenborg, 1996:1644-1645). The potential ‘gains’ for 
advocates lobbying for human responsibilities, including the potential adoption by the 
UNGA of a universal declaration of human responsibilities, simultaneously generated 
firm opposition from Western state and non-state actors, such as the press and 
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human rights defenders, whose ‘interests’ were perceived to be ‘threatened’ by such 
potential ‘gains’ (AI, 1998; Giacomazzi, 2005:172; IAC, 1998; Meyer & Staggenborg, 
1996:1638). Indeed, the issue of human responsibilities was perceived as 
‘symbolising’ an entire set of human rights-related ‘values’, which concerned the 
entire international human rights legal framework and, thus, ‘threatened’ a wide 
range of actors, who opposed the issue for a number of reasons (AI, 1998; EU, 
2004, 2005; Giacomazzi, 2005:172; IAC, 1998; Meyer & Staggenborg, 1996:1639; 
Robinson, 1998a:120).  
 
As resistance to a campaign is ‘sustainable’ to the extent that opponents are 
able to frame the dissension as reflecting broad societal ‘value cleavages’, the 
effectiveness of counter-campaigns to human responsibilities initiatives is due, in 
part, to their ability to frame their disagreement with such initiatives as reflecting a 
broader societal ‘value cleavage’, namely a common interest in effective human 
rights protection (Meyer & Staggenborg, 1996:1639). They argued that a focus on 
human responsibilities would ‘undermine’ and ‘weaken’ human rights and 
fundamental freedoms and, thus, were able to gain broad-based support for their 
‘counter-frame’ (AI, 1998:1-5; EU, 2004, 2005). 
 
 
2.7. Conclusion 
 
This chapter has advanced the proposition that the initiatives of the IAC in the 
1990s and the LMG in the 2000s were partially effective, to the extent that they were 
able to set the issue of human responsibilities on the international agenda. The 
partial successes of the strategies and tactics adopted by such initiatives, in addition 
to the availability of opportunities facilitating such activities, have been presented 
with reference to the international political opportunity framework. The extent to 
which the partial effectiveness of such initiatives raised alarm and counter-
mobilisation by Western state and non-state actors, who perceived the potential for 
the success of such initiatives and, thus, decisively intervened to prevent the 
development and adoption by the UNGA of a universal declaration of human 
responsibilities, is discussed in the following chapter. 
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Chapter 3 
Challenges encountered by Transnational Campaigns for Human 
Responsibilities 
 
3.1. Overview  
 
Identifying counter-campaigns as effective in obstructing the development of a 
UN declaration on human responsibilities, this chapter provides some historical 
background on the activities of opponents to transnational campaigns for human 
responsibilities and considers the opportunities, strategies and tactics employed by 
such opposing initiatives, which, ultimately, served to facilitate their success. The 
chapter, subsequently, discusses the ongoing challenges encountered by 
contemporary human responsibilities campaigns, considering the severely limited 
political opportunities available to them, due to the constant potential for ‘counter-
mobilisation’ by an array of unrelentingly firm opponents to their key objectives. 
 
 
3.2. An Overview of Significant Initiatives to Counter Transnational  
       Campaigns for Human Responsibilities (1990s–2000s) 
 
While there generally has been a lack of sufficient support for the 
transnational campaigns for human responsibilities addressed by this dissertation, 
the initiatives of the IAC and the LMG actually attracted a significant amount of 
opposition (AI, 1998, 2005:43; EU, 2004, 2005). Arguably, these two initiatives were 
the most prominent and seemed most likely to succeed, thus ‘threatening’ the 
‘interests’ of their opposition (AI, 1998; EU, 2004, 2005; IAC, 1998; Meyer & 
Staggenborg, 1996:1635; Robinson, 1998a:120). Indeed, the common primary 
objective of such campaigns to propose a universal declaration of human 
responsibilities to the UNGA for adoption ‘threatened’ the ‘interests’ of a number of 
actors, including Western governments and members of Western civil society, 
including the press and human rights defenders (AI, 1998; EU, 2004, 2005; 
Giacomazzi, 2005:172; IAC, 1998; Meyer & Staggenborg, 1996:1635; Robinson, 
1998a:120).  
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The emergence of effective counter-campaigns to advocacy efforts for human 
responsibilities, further, can be attributed to the availability of ‘political allies’, 
particularly ‘political elites’, who were able to take advantage of their positions and 
‘organisational platforms’ to take action against these initiatives in various ways (AI, 
1998; EU, 2004, 2005; Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:899; Meyer & Staggenborg, 
1996:1635). A significant number of states and prominent international human rights 
NGOs persistently have opposed the regulation of responsibilities or duties of 
individuals to the community (AI, 1998, 2005:43; Clapham, 1998; EU, 2004, 2005). 
They argue that such regulation potentially could jeopardise and ‘undermine’ human 
rights standards and the rights of human rights defenders, thus ‘weakening’ state 
obligations to protect, respect and fulfil human rights (AI, 1998:1-5; EU, 2004, 2005). 
 
 
3.2.1. Opposition to the IAC Universal Declaration of Human Responsibilities 
 
There has been widespread opposition to the IAC Declaration among 
Western governments and members of Western civil society, including prominent 
international human rights NGOs and activists, the media and influential academics 
(AI, 1998; Clapham, 1998; Koh, 1998; Robinson, 1998a:120). When in September, 
1997, the IAC Declaration was forwarded to heads of state and government, 
Western governments generally contended that ‘oppressive regimes’ could ‘misuse’ 
the declaration, by embracing the notion of human responsibilities as a ‘substitute’ 
for the fulfilment of human rights, thus ‘undermining’ and ‘weakening’ the 
international human rights framework (AI, 1998:1; Giacomazzi, 2005:172; IAC, 1997, 
1998; Suter, 2012:47). A similar view was conveyed at a number of public 
presentations in Australia, at which participants, responding to the proposed idea of 
a UN declaration on human responsibilities, expressed ‘suspicion’ that initiatives for 
human responsibilities were intended to prevent advancement in international human 
rights protection (Suter, 2012:51). 
 
On January 27, 1998, almost five months after the publishing of the IAC 
Declaration, former Irish President Mary Robinson (1944– ), who recently had been 
appointed as UNHCHR, gave attention to the IAC Declaration at the ‘Symposium on 
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Human Rights in the Asia-Specific Region’ at the University of Tokyo, Japan 
(Robinson, 1998a:117). Although acknowledging the important ‘insights’ brought to 
the UDHR by the initiatives of the IAC and other proponents of human 
responsibilities and recognising the necessity of a renewed ‘focus’ on ‘duties’ and 
‘obligations’, Robinson (1998a:120) made a persuasive argument that it would be 
‘wise’ to evade the ‘distraction’ of adopting a ‘new declaration’ and, rather, to 
maintain a focus on the UDHR and other international human rights instruments.  
 
Among the international human rights community, AI (1998) was a key actor 
opposing the proposed IAC Declaration. In April, 1998, AI (1998:1, 4) published an 
influential article, which expressed agreement on a few sections of the declaration 
but argued, ultimately, that it ‘undermined’ and ‘weakened’ the UDHR and related 
human rights standards, but introducing ‘vague’ reformulations of human rights. AI 
(1998:1, 6-7) concluded that the IAC Declaration was not complementary to the 
UDHR and offered no significant ‘contribution’ to more pertinent ‘discussions’ at the 
UN, calling, instead, for a renewed focus on states’ obligations for the fulfilment of 
human rights and for the adoption by the UNGA of the DHRD at its upcoming 
session in December, 1998. Expressing a similar view, Swedish Ambassador and 
former AI Secretary-General Thomas Hammarberg (1998), who has been described 
by Robinson (1998b) as an enduring ‘defender’ of human rights, argued in 1999 that, 
rather than serving to balance human rights, the IAC Declaration, as a ‘parallel’ 
declaration, would create an ‘imbalance’ and ‘confusion’ regarding the importance of 
the UDHR, as well as potential opportunities for governmental authorities to 
concentrate solely on responsibilities and duties, while repressing rights 
(Hammarberg, 1999:iii). 
 
The ICJ, too, expressed criticism on the IAC Declaration (Clapham, 1998). At 
the ICJ Triennial Meeting, held in July, 1998, in Cape Town, South Africa, the IAC 
Declaration was addressed by British activist and international legal professor 
Andrew Clapham (1962– ) (1998), who, until 1997, had been an observer for AI at 
the UNCHR and likely was involved in the contentious debate on the relationship 
between rights and duties at the 1993 working group drafting the DHRD (UNCHR, 
1993). Clapham (1998) argued that the emphasis of the declaration on responsibility 
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is not reflective of the traditional ‘approach’ of ‘international human rights law’, which 
assigns obligations for individuals’ rights to states, which they are to ‘respect’ within 
their ‘jurisdictions’. He argued that concepts of responsibility and community 
emphasise ‘transnational solidarity’ and the addition of an ‘ethical’ aspect to 
‘international relations’ and that the IAC was departing from ‘law’ by adopting ethical 
principles that cannot ‘fit comfortably’ within the international human rights legal 
framework (Carpenter, 2007:104; Clapham, 1998; Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:908; 
Florini, 1996:376). While suggesting that a lesser emphasis on states’ obligations 
would ‘dilute’ and, ultimately, ‘undermine’ the international human rights framework, 
Clapham (1998) refocused on law enforcement, noting the significant involvement of 
the ICJ in the, then, recent establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC).  
 
A number of prominent and influential legal academics, including Clapham 
and Dutch jurist and Professor Emeritus Theodore Van Boven (1934– ), also, have 
addressed the topic of individuals’ responsibilities (UNCHR, 2002a:23-24). While 
acknowledging that the IAC Declaration presents some useful ideas, Van Boven has 
expressed criticism on its failure to identify the significance of economic globalisation 
and the consequential increasing power of ‘economic’ actors, who should be 
assigned appropriate ‘responsibilities’ and ‘duties’ in the field of human rights 
(Clapham, 1998; UNCHR, 2002a:23). Arguing that the fundamental aspect of 
‘corporate responsibility’, for the most part, is disregarded within the IAC Declaration, 
Van Boven concludes that, if the IAC actually intends to respond to globalisation, it 
should address the consequences of the ‘market’ for rights, particularly those of 
vulnerable populations, and the ‘accountability’ of non-state actors (Clapham, 1998).  
 
While addressing issues relating to social inequality in a speech at the 
University of Cape Town in August, 2013, incumbent British MP and Deputy Leader 
of the Liberal Democratic Party Simon Hughes (1951– ) (2013) argued, similarly, that 
neglect of such corporate responsibility poses greater challenges to wealth equality 
than does that of individual responsibility. As an aside, it is interesting to note that in 
2003, at the time when Martínez proposed the DHSR, the UNCHR considered, also, 
the ‘Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other 
Business Enterprises with regard to Human Rights’ (NRTC), a proposal of codified 
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duties of corporations and businesses (Knox, 2008:1; UNCHR, 2003a). However, the 
NRTC, like the DHSR, received limited support, and also was not adopted by the 
UNCHR before its replacement by the UNHRC in 2006, nor has it been considered 
by the new human rights body since that time (Knox, 2008:1). 
 
Following on from earlier criticisms of proposed declarations of human 
responsibilities, academic and human rights legal expert John Knox (2008:33), more 
recently, has expressed further objections to the IAC Declaration. Reiterating the 
argument of Australian legal academic Ben Saul, he contends that, although the 
document adopts the rhetoric of ‘correlative duty’ at times, such ‘correlations’ are 
‘ambiguous’, ‘imprecise’ and ‘incomplete’, thus having the potential to result in 
‘confusion’ regarding pre-existing ‘correlative duties’ and, ultimately, to weaken such 
duties (Knox, 2008:33-34). Restating the arguments of previous opponents to the 
claims made by human responsibilities initiatives, he explains that such a universal 
declaration of specific ‘converse duties’ would be unnecessary in enhancing the 
enforcement by states of duties already codified under domestic laws and argues 
that such duties, instead, would weaken, undermine and ‘restrict’ existing rights, as 
well as the duties that usually are derived from such rights (AI, 1998:1-5; Clapham, 
1998; Knox, 2008:33-34). 
 
The IAC Declaration, also, generally was resisted by the Western press 
(Giacomazzi, 2005:173; IAC, 1998). The World Freedom Press Committee (WFPC) 
sent a ‘joint letter’ to the UNSG, expressing concern regarding the ‘freedom of the 
press’ (IAC, 1998). Referring to Article 14 of the IAC Declaration, which states that 
the ‘freedom’ of the press to ‘inform the public’ and to ‘criticise’ societal ‘institutions’ 
and ‘governmental actions’ should be utilised with ‘responsibility’ and ‘discretion’ and 
that such ‘freedom’ should be accompanied by a ‘responsibility’ for ‘reporting’ that is 
‘accurate’ and ‘truthful’, members of the Western media expressed concern about 
who would judge such responsible journalism (Giacomazzi, 2005:165; 173; IAC, 
1997, 1998). AI (1998:4) argued, similarly, that a number of ‘ill-defined’ and ‘vague’ 
concepts had been included in the document. Furthermore, prominent news 
companies expressed criticism of the IAC Declaration in articles published at the 
time. For instance, on December 10, 1998, the New York Times published an article, 
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stating that the IAC Declaration , while claiming to complement the UDHR, ultimately 
aroused much suspicion and opposition in the Western human rights community and 
that there had been a lack of consensus on the merit of the document (Koh, 1998).  
 
 
3.2.2. Opposition to the UNCHR-Sponsored Pre-Draft Declaration on Human  
Social Responsibilities 
 
Throughout the deliberations, concerning the study on human rights and 
human responsibilities at the UNCHR during the period between 2000 and 2005, 
there was firm opposition toward the issue from Western delegacies and influential 
human rights defenders, who persistently rejected the proposal to draft a UN 
declaration on human responsibilities (EU, 2004, 2005). In reviewing the responses 
to the questionnaire included in his 2002 ‘Preliminary Report on Human Rights and 
Human Responsibilities’, Martínez had found a lack of responses from NGOs and, 
once having inquired into the issue, learned that the OHCHR, for some reason, may 
have failed to send the questionnaire to them (UNCHR, 2002a:19, 32; 2003b:2). 
 
While the number of governmental responses to the questionnaire was 
relatively low, they reflected an evident division between developed states of the 
Global North, whose responses opposed a formal correlation between individuals’ 
rights and responsibilities, and developing states of the South, whose replies 
acknowledged such a correlation (UNCHR, 2003b:2-3). Polarisation on the issue 
also was evidenced during the discussions that took place during Martínez’s working 
visits to European cities, such as Brussels and Madrid, as well as during his 
discussions with governmental officials and civil society members of Asian and 
African states (UNCHR, 2003b:3). 
 
When, in April, 2004, Chinese and Cuban delegates, on behalf of the LMG, 
requested that the OHCHR determine general views on the DHSR, Western states 
unanimously expressed firm opposition to the proposal (UNCHR, 2004b:82-83, 
2005a). Nevertheless, the resolution was adopted by one vote, again reflecting stark 
polarisation on the issue (UNCHR, 2004b:82; UN Information Service, 2004). At the 
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2004 ECOSOC Annual Substantive Session, the Dutch delegate, on behalf of the 
EU (2004), again, expressed strong opposition to the decision by the UNCHR to 
request the OHCHR to compile the report and presented a counterproposal in the 
form of a draft decision, supported by forty-one delegations including the UK, 
Germany, Mexico and the US, requesting ECOSOC, the parent body of the UNCHR 
(UNCHR, 2004b:82-83), to ‘overturn’ the decision.  
 
On behalf of the EU (2004), firm opposition to the resolution was expressed 
on both ‘substantive’ and ‘procedural’ grounds. The Dutch delegate argued that, 
unlike the study on human rights and human responsibilities, the DHSR had not 
been mandated by the UNCHR (EU, 2004). While not disputing the existence of 
duties and responsibilities, the German delegate opposed any attempt to render 
human rights ‘conditional’ on the performance of duties (EU, 2004). Although all of 
the responses to the inquiry into the views of non-state and state actors on the 
DHSR, excepting those of China and Cuba, were ‘overwhelming’ critical, the draft 
decision presented by the Dutch delegate was rejected by one vote (EU, 2004; 
UNCHR, 2005a:36).  
 
When, at the final meeting of the UNCHR (2005a, 2005b:15) in April, 2005, 
China, on behalf of the LMG, introduced another resolution, requesting Martínez to 
prepare a revised ‘version’ of the DHSR for its consideration, the resolution was 
adopted by one vote and, initially, was endorsed, also, by ECOSOC (UN, 2005; 
UNCHR, 2005c:341). In a press release issued on April 22, 2005, AI (2005:43) 
expressed ‘regret’ that the resolution had been adopted, contending that the UNCHR 
was an inappropriate setting to consider ‘moral’ and ‘ethical’ matters relating to 
individuals’ societal duties and responsibilities. AI (2005:43) argued, further, that 
attempts to draft such a declaration at the UNCHR had the potential of being 
‘exploited’ by governments attempting to disqualify existing ‘internationally’ accepted 
‘standards’, to evade their fundamental human rights obligations to individuals within 
their jurisdictions and to hinder the activities of human rights defenders. 
 
When, at the 2005 ECOSOC Annual Substantive Session, the delegate of the 
UK, on behalf of the EU (2005), called for a vote to reconsider the proposal to further 
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the study on human rights and human responsibilities, the British delegate argued 
that human rights are ‘inalienable’ and ‘inherent’ in each person and that a focus on 
individual responsibilities could ‘undermine’ the ‘universality’ of human rights (EU, 
2005). Delegates representing the EU (2005) commonly rejected the idea that states 
should determine the rights that could be enjoyed by individuals, which, they argued, 
ultimately, would ‘undermine’ the UN Charter and the UDHR. It was argued that 
ECOSOC, as the parent body of the UNCHR, had the duty to assess the decisions 
of the UNCHR and, if necessary, to reject resolutions that undermined fundamental 
UN principles (EU, 2005). ECOSOC (2005a) rejected, by two votes, the draft 
decision presented by the British delegate, thus discontinuing the development of the 
DHSR and the study on human rights and human responsibilities (EU, 2005). 
 
Since that time, a number of prominent and influential legal academics, who 
previously had voiced concerns about the IAC Declaration in the 1990s, have raised 
similar concerns about the DHSR. Indeed, Knox (2008:1-2, 32-35) has expressed 
firm opposition to the DHSR, arguing that the ‘principles’ detailed within the DHSR 
are potentially harmful to human rights instruments and that the document contains 
‘vague’ formulations of responsibilities, having the potential to ‘limit’, ‘weaken’ and 
‘undermine’ the international human rights legal framework (Clapham, 1998).  
 
 
3.3. Opportunities and Strategies used by Initiatives Challenging  
       Transnational Campaigns for Human Responsibilities  
 
In seeking to explain the emergence, strategies and political outcomes of 
initiatives challenging human responsibilities campaigns, it, first, is necessary to 
consider the political and cultural contexts in which such opponents emerged. 
Human responsibilities initiatives, particularly those of the IAC and the LMG, to some 
extent, seemed to be potentially successful, as they effectively set the issue of 
human responsibilities on the international agenda (AI, 1998, 2005:43; Clapham, 
1998; Meyer & Staggenborg, 1996:1635; Robinson, 1998a:120). The ‘interests’ of 
Western governments and civil society members, including the international human 
rights community and the press, were ‘threatened’ by the objective of proponents of 
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human responsibilities to see the adoption of a UN declaration on human 
responsibilities (Giacomazzi, 2005:172; IAC, 1998; Meyer & Staggenborg, 
1996:1635).  
 
Furthermore, ‘allies’, including both state and non-state actors, were 
‘available’ to support opposing initiatives (IAC, 1998, 2005; EU, 2004, 2005; Meyer & 
Staggenborg, 1996:1635). The following section seeks to portray the ways in which 
‘positions’ of political elites, possible ‘routes’ of collective ‘action’ and the probability 
of effectiveness influenced the opportunities available for ‘counter-mobilisation’ and 
the ‘strategies’ and ‘tactics’ selected by opponents (Meyer & Staggenborg, 
1996:1643). 
 
 
3.3.1. Favourable Contextual Factors for Initiatives Challenging Transnational  
          Campaigns for Human Responsibilities 
 
The factors that constrained the opportunities available to initiatives 
advocating for human responsibilities, simultaneously, created favourable conditions 
for their opponents (Busby, 2007:252). Both ‘institutionally-oriented’ and ‘extra-
institutional’ aspects of the international political opportunity structure, arguably, were 
‘permissive’ to such opposing initiatives (Busby, 2007:252; Meyer & Staggenborg, 
1996:1650). As the claims of proponents for a universal declaration of human 
responsibilities have tended to lack ‘credibility’, initiatives challenging transnational 
campaigns for human responsibilities relatively easily have been able to counter 
such claims (AI, 1998:2; Busby, 2007:253; Clapham, 1998; Hammarberg, 1999:iii). 
 
The common overarching objective of proponents of human responsibilities to 
have a universal declaration of human responsibilities adopted by the UNGA have 
not ‘fit comfortably’ within the international human rights legal framework for a 
number of reasons (Carpenter, 2007:104; Clapham, 1998; Finnemore & Sikkink, 
1998:908; Florini, 1996:376).  The IAC (1997, 1998) has emphasised that its 
declaration is ‘morally binding’, rather than ‘legally binding’, and Martínez, similarly, 
focused on ‘moral’ and ‘ethical’ responsibilities and duties (UNCHR, 2002a:9).  
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Regarding the question of the role of ethical or moral duties and 
responsibilities under international human rights law, opposing initiatives have 
referred to the legality of the international human rights framework, to the 
establishment in 1998 of the ICC and to the need for all states to ratify ‘international 
human rights treaties’ (AI, 1998:7; Clapham, 1998; Robinson, 1998b). While arguing 
that proponents of human responsibilities have tended to ‘conflate’ law with ethics, 
opposing initiatives have emphasised the importance of the ‘rule of law’ in providing 
international human rights protection (AI, 1998:7; Clapham, 1998). Indeed, 
international  human rights NGOs, including the ICJ, AI (1998:2-3, 2005:43) and the 
International Justice Mission, have maintained their focus on legally enforceable 
obligations, primarily those of states, for the fulfilment of human rights protection, 
rather than to address ‘ethical’ or ‘moral’ duties of individuals (Clapham, 1998; IJM, 
2013).  
 
Another way in which such declarations of human responsibilities lack 
‘resonance’ with international human rights law lies in their defining characteristic of 
assigning responsibilities and duties to individuals (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:908; 
Florini, 1996:377; Payne, 2001:43). Conventionally, obligations for the fulfilment of 
individuals’ human rights are assigned to states, whereas proponents of human 
responsibilities have underlined specific responsibilities and duties of individuals, 
which go beyond the arguably necessarily unspecific ‘duties to the community’ under 
Article 29(1) of the UDHR (Clapham, 1998; Giacomazzi, 2005:173; Hammarberg, 
1999:i).  
 
Concerning the question of individual responsibility, opponents to human 
responsibilities campaigns have countered the claims of such campaigns, by arguing 
that the role of individual responsibility under international human rights law is not a 
theoretical issue but one of ‘emphasis’ (Clapham, 2008). Such counter-campaigns 
have reaffirmed the traditional focus on international human rights law on state 
obligations, rather than individual duties, as prime in the fulfilment of international 
human rights protection, by referring to the IBR, the VCLT (1969) and more recent 
international human rights instruments, including the VDPA, which commonly affirm 
that states, rather than individuals, are the primary bearers of obligation for human 
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rights protection (AI, 1998:6-7; Clapham, 1998; Hammarberg, 1999:i-iii; UN, 1993; 
UNGA, 1993a). 
 
Advocates for human responsibilities have justified their focus on the issue by 
questioning the ‘universality’ of human rights (Clapham, 1998). Arguing that the 
UDHR is not reflective of Asian cultures, they reiterate the cultural relativist claim 
regarding the contrast between Western human rights principles and ‘Asian values’, 
which emphasise individual duty and responsibility (Berthrong, 2003:199; Clapham, 
1998; Flynn, 2005:245; Korey, 1998:469). With regard to the universality of human 
rights, opposing initiatives have referred to the VWCHR, at which the UDHR and the 
universality of human rights were ‘reaffirmed’ via the adoption of the VDPA (Bell, 
1994:21; Clapham, 1998).  
 
Furthermore, South Sudanese academic and diplomat Francis Deng (1938– ) 
argues that it is abusers of ‘human rights principles’ and their proponents, rather than 
‘victims’ of such violations, who raise the cultural ‘relativist’ claim against universalist 
principles (Clapham, 1998). Asserting the ‘normative’ argument that relativist claims 
cannot be employed as excuses for human rights violations, he contends that each 
‘diverse culture’ should be regarded as a ‘unique opportunity’ to reinforce standards 
of international human rights law with ‘culturally-specific principles’ of upholding 
human dignity (Clapham, 1998). Responding to the relativist claim that democratic 
principles and values are ‘Western exports’, incumbent US President Barack Obama 
(1961– ) (2013) made a similar argument in a speech at the University of Cape Town 
in June, 2013, when he contended that those in power who offer such judgments 
usually are attempting to ‘distract’ victims from their own violations of human rights.  
 
With regard to advocacy efforts for human responsibilities, it is noteworthy 
that human rights violations are reported by UN delegates and human rights 
defenders, including Hammarberg (1998) and international human rights NGOs such 
as Human Rights Voices, to occur in a number of LMG states, whose delegates 
raised the issue of human responsibilities at the UNCHR in 2000 (UNCHR, 2000; 
HRV, 2013; US Department of State, 2012). For instance, Egypt, one of the 
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sponsors of the resolution, has experienced civil uprisings demanding so-called 
‘Western’ human rights protection in recent years (Clapham, 1998; Landler, 2013).  
 
Furthermore, in 1998 Hammarberg (1998) argued that the Cuban government 
had failed to ‘cooperate’ with SRs by disallowing one to visit Cuba. He argued, 
further, that Cuba had done its ‘utmost’ to dilute the DHRD, which was being drafted 
at the time (Hammarberg, 1998). The human rights situation in Cuba also was 
addressed by the UNCHR (2002b; 2005a) as an area of major concern during the 
time at which the issue of human responsibilities was on its agenda (UN, 2005). 
Therefore, LMG states, arguably, lacked ‘credibility’ when presenting the claim that 
the DHSR was intended to enhance human rights protection, which, in turn, provided 
credibility to the argument of Western governments that LMG states were seeking to 
divert attention from their state obligations (Busby, 2007:253; Giacomazzi, 2005:172; 
EU, 2004, 2005; Yishanat, 2004). 
 
Furthermore, the SAHRDC argued in 2003 that UNCHR ‘mechanisms’ had 
encountered ‘unprecedented’ challenges during the ten-year period since the 
VWCHR, due to reported attempts by LMG states to ‘weaken’ such mechanisms 
(UNCHR, 2003c). Indeed, while affirming that some proponents of declarations of 
human responsibilities possibly fail to comprehend the degree to which such 
declarations, ultimately, would ‘weaken’ international human rights law, Knox 
(2008:35) notes the ‘background’ to the drafting of the DHSR as ‘revealing’ of the 
intentions of LMG states to weaken international human rights law. Indeed, the 
decision to appoint Martínez as UNSR was regarded as ‘controversial’ at the time, 
considering that Cuba, as an LMG state, had been one of the primary sponsors of 
the initiative since its emergence (Knox, 2008:35-36; UNCHR, 2002a:5, 2005a:36; 
UNHCHR, 2000a). Martínez, as a delegate at the UNCHR (2005a:37), had ‘played’ a 
persuasive ‘role’ both in the ‘plenary’ and during ‘informal’ discussions, despite being 
the author of the study on human rights and human responsibilities and of the 
DHSR, in his role as ‘independent’ UNSR of the Sub-Commission on the Promotion 
and Protection of Human Rights.  
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Considering that the ‘positions’ and reactions of ‘authorities’ and branches of 
government significantly ‘influence’ the ‘strategies’ and ‘tactics’ employed by 
campaigns advocating for an issue, and taking into account the role played by 
Robinson (1998a:120) in framing human responsibilities as a ‘distraction’ to human 
rights, the role played by an incumbent UNHCHR, arguably, is of particular 
significance in facilitating or constraining the development of a certain norm or 
international human rights standard (IAC, 1998; Meyer & Staggenborg, 1996:1650). 
Indeed, Brazilian diplomat Sérgio Vieira de Mello (1948–2003), who served as 
UNHCHR during the period between 2002 and 2003, devoted attention specifically to 
the importance of the rule of international law and, thus, would not have been a likely 
candidate to promote the development of the DHSR, as a document focusing on 
moral and ethical responsibilities (“UN High Commissioner for Human Rights”, 
2002). Indeed, while in office, de Mello stated that the ‘overarching theme’ of the 
work of the OHCHR would be to promote the ‘rule of law’, without which it would be 
impossible to maintain ‘respect’ for human rights, democracy and good governance 
(“UN High Commissioner for Human Rights”, 2002). The dominant focus of de Mello 
on law enforcement, arguably, was a significant contextual factor favourable to 
challengers of transnational campaigns for human responsibilities. 
 
A number of additional contextual factors may have served, further, to 
constrain the issue of human responsibilities at the UNCHR. While serving as the 
Special Representative of the UNSG to Iraq since May, 2003, de Mello and twenty-
one of his colleagues were assassinated on August 19, 2003, in the Canal Hotel 
Bombing in Baghdad, Iraq, the ‘bloodiest’ UN-targeted attack in history (De Mello 
Foundation, 2013; UN Information Service, 2004). Following prominent terrorist 
attacks, including the attacks on the World Trade Centre on September 11, 2001, 
and the 2003 UN-targeted attack in Baghdad, the focus on the importance of the 
‘rule of law’, arguably, gained increased attention (UN, 2005; UN Information 
Service, 2004).  
 
Guyanese diplomat Bertrand Ramcharan (1943– ) served as Acting UNHCHR 
from 2003 until July 1, 2004, when Canadian Louise Arbour (1947– ) assumed office 
(UNCHR, 2004a; UN Information Service, 2004). During his short term in office, 
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Ramcharan focused on issues concerning human rights violations, such as human 
trafficking, terrorism and lacking law enforcement (UNCHR, 2004a; UN Information 
Service, 2004). When the IAC Declaration was proposed in the late 1990s, 
Ramcharan had addressed the issue of individuals’ responsibilities in an article 
focusing on the ‘universality of human rights’, which was published by the ICJ in 
1997 (UNCHR, 2002a:25). Arbour, who served as UNHCHR until August 31, 2008, 
when former South African jurist and incumbent UNHCHR Navanethem Pillay 
(1941– ) assumed office, similarly emphasised the importance of the rule of 
international law. Such an emphasis on the rule of international law by prominent 
human rights activists, including high commissioners for human rights, arguably, 
served further to create a context favourable to initiatives challenging transnational 
campaigns for human responsibilities. 
 
Furthermore, the reform of UN human rights machinery during the 2000s, 
particularly the replacement of the UNCHR by the UNHRC in 2006, arguably, has 
been a contextual factor favouring potential challengers to transnational campaigns 
for human responsibilities. In his address to the UNCHR on April 7, 2005, former 
UNSG Kofi Annan proposed the establishment of the UNHRC, which would be 
comprised of a smaller membership than that of the UNCHR and which was 
envisioned as a ‘chamber of peer review’, tasked with evaluating the fulfilment by all 
states of their obligations for human rights protection, thus reinforcing the universality 
and indivisibility of human rights (UN, 2005).  
 
Considering the focus of the UNHRC on evaluating such obligations of states, 
the new human rights body, arguably, provides severely constrained political 
opportunities to initiatives advocating for human responsibilities, particularly to 
potential initiatives by LMG states, such as Cuba and China, which have poor human 
rights records and whose claims regarding human rights issues, therefore, 
resultantly tend to be regarded as less credible (UNCHR, 2002b, 2005a). Indeed, 
Western states, notably including the US, have tended to provide ‘support’ to NGOs, 
whose memberships comprise of ‘exiled opponents’ of the Cuban government, while 
opposing Cuban initiatives and NGOs supported by their government (Boström, 
2011:9). 
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3.3.2. Focusing Events employed by Initiatives Challenging Transnational  
          Campaigns for Human Responsibilities 
 
A number of counter-campaigns to human responsibilities initiatives raised the 
‘public profile’ and ‘salience’ of the issue by addressing it from their ‘organisational 
platforms’ at international conferences, symposiums and ‘regularly scheduled’ 
sessions and meetings (Busby, 2007:253; Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:899). Indeed, 
it has been argued by a number of theorists that such events can serve to raise the 
profile of an issue and that the perspectives of prominent individuals can influence 
political and policy outcomes on the issue in question (Busby, 2007:253; Shawki, 
2010:392-393). For instance, when Robinson (1998a:120), at a symposium in 
January, 1998, referred to the IAC Declaration as a ‘distraction’, the ‘perceived’ 
credibility of her words, as being raised by a prominent human rights defender, 
arguably, influenced the dominant discourse on the issue of human responsibilities 
(Busby, 2007:253). 
 
In July, 1998, at a meeting held by the ICJ, Clapham (1998) addressed the 
issue of human responsibilities, while paying particular attention to the weaknesses 
of the IAC Declaration as conflating law and ethics and as focusing unnecessarily on 
the role of individual responsibility, rather than the necessary obligations of more 
powerful actors, including states as primary bearers of obligations for human rights 
protection, and multinational corporations as requiring more emphasis than 
individuals in discussions on responsibility for international human rights protection. 
In referring to the question of increased ‘corporate responsibility’, Clapham (1998) 
gave further prominence to an issue raised by Van Boven. 
 
When the IAC proposed that the UNGA adopt the IAC Declaration at the 1998 
session of the UNGA, in order to coincide with the fiftieth anniversary of its adoption 
of the UDHR, AI (1998:7) recommended, instead, that the UNGA adopt the DHRD, 
which had been in the process of being drafted since the mid-1980s. Thus, by taking 
advantage of the ‘critical event’ of the anniversary of the adoption of the UDHR, the 
IAC encouraged simultaneous ‘counter-mobilisation’ by AI members, who, in turn, 
took advantage of the opportunity highlighted by the IAC to refocus attention on the 
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DHRD (Meyer & Staggenborg, 1996:1638). Adopting ‘parallel tactics’ to those 
employed by the IAC and UNESCO, AI set an ‘expiry date’ or time limit on the 
adoption by the UNGA of the DHRD. The proposal made by AI was successful, and 
the DHRD was adopted by the UNGA (1998a) in the ‘commemorative year’ of the 
fiftieth anniversary of its adoption of the UDHR (HRF, 2013). 
 
The ‘regularly scheduled’ sessions and meetings of the UNCHR and 
ECOSOC, also, provided opportunities for ‘oppositional mobilisation’ on the issue of 
human responsibilities (Busby, 2007:253; Meyer & Staggenborg, 1996:1635). 
Delegates representing member-states of the EU (2004, 2005) took advantage of the 
annually scheduled substantive sessions of ECOSOC to draw attention to the 
negative implications of the development of the DHSR at the UNCHR (Busby, 
2007:253). In this instance, the EU (2004, 2005) employed the ‘structural’ tactic of 
adopting conventional ‘channels of influence’ and appealing to the ‘parent body’ of 
the UNCHR to intervene in the affairs of the UNCHR (Shawki, 2010:384; Meyer & 
Staggenborg, 1996:1650). 
 
 
3.3.3. Counter-Frames Challenging Transnational Campaigns for Human  
Responsibilities 
 
In addition to the ‘institutionally-oriented’ tactics employed by initiatives 
challenging transnational campaigns for human responsibilities, ‘extra-institutional’ 
tactics, including the use of ‘counter-frames’, also, have been employed in order to 
provide alternative interpretations of the issue of human responsibilities (Meyer & 
Staggenborg, 1996:1650; Shawki, 2010:384). Opponents to the idea of human 
responsibilities framed the issue in a number of ways. For instance, Robinson 
(1998a:120) framed human responsibilities as a potential ‘distraction’ to human 
rights protection, arguing that, rather than to create an additional declaration, it was 
necessary to maintain a dominant ‘focus’ on the significance of the UDHR and 
related instruments of the international human rights legal framework. 
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AI (1998:1-5) framed human responsibilities as having the ‘potential’ to 
‘undermine’ and ‘weaken’ the international human rights framework (Clapham, 1998; 
Knox, 2008:1-2). When the IAC Declaration was proposed, AI (1998:4) published an 
article, framing the introduction of the concept of human responsibilities as ‘vague’, 
unspecific, and ‘ill-defined concepts’, which ‘weakened’ the ‘specifically’ defined 
human rights under the UDHR. Arguing that the IAC Declaration ‘understated’ the 
UDHR, AI (1998:3, 6-7) used the opportunity to refocus attention on state obligations 
and the necessity of ‘rule of law’.  
 
Western states framed human responsibilities as having the potential to be 
exploited, or ‘misused’, by ‘oppressive regimes’ (Giacomazzi, 2005:172; IAC, 1998). 
They argued that governments raising objections to the universality of human rights, 
such of those of many Asian states and various LMG states, potentially could refer to 
the notion of human responsibilities as a ‘substitute’ for their state obligations for the 
fulfilment of the human rights of individuals within their jurisdictions (Giacomazzi, 
2005:172; IAC, 1998). With regard to the human rights situations of LMG states, 
including China, Cuba and Egypt, this frame used by Western states, arguably, was 
fairly persuasive (Hammarberg, 1998; Landler, 2013). 
 
The Western media framed human responsibilities as a potential 
‘infringement’ on the right of the press to freedom of expression (Giacomazzi, 
2005:173; IAC, 1998). Representatives of prominent news companies expressed 
concern about the ‘freedom’ of the media and about who would judge the extent to 
which their journalism was ‘truthful’ and ‘accurate’ (Giacomazzi, 2005:165; IAC, 
1998). Moreover, as journalists, writing for prominent news companies, responded to 
the ‘claims’ of initiatives for human responsibilities by exploring the existence of 
‘opposing interests’ to such claims, ‘mass media coverage’ served to increase the 
political opportunities for opponents through the publicising of claims countering 
those of proponents of human responsibilities (Gamson & Meyer, 1996:287-288; 
Koh, 1998; Meyer & Staggenborg, 1996:1641-1642).  
 
In addition to the role played by ‘mainstream media’ in serving a ‘mechanistic’ 
function of providing a ‘balanced’ perspective, a similar role, arguably, has been 
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played by academics and international legal experts, including Van Boven, Knox and 
members of the Geneva-based International Council on Human Rights Policy 
(ICHRP), which originally was chaired by Hammarberg (1999:iv) and was founded in 
1998 to conduct research into human rights-related issues (Clapham, 1998; Gamson 
& Meyer, 1996:287-288; Knox, 2008; Meyer & Staggenborg, 1996:1641-1642). In 
turn, these academics served to enhance the ‘credibility’ of ‘counter-arguments’ to 
the claims of proponents for human responsibilities (Busby, 2007:253). 
 
At ECOSOC in 2004 and 2005, the delegates of the Netherlands and the UK, 
on behalf of the EU, framed human responsibilities as undermining the foundations 
of human rights (EU, 2004, 2005). European delegates expressed firm opposition to 
the DHSR on both substantive and procedural grounds (EU, 2004). Among the 
‘substantive’ arguments raised were that it is ‘inconsistent’ with the fundamental 
concept of human rights for states to premise respect for individual human rights on 
their assessment of the satisfaction of individual responsibilities (EU, 2004, 2005). It 
was argued that the DHSR ‘undermines’ the principles of ‘universality’, ‘inalienability’, 
‘non-discrimination’ and ‘entitlement’ without interference or qualification by a state 
outside that permitted under human rights treaties (EU, 2004, 2005). 
 
The issue of human responsibilities typically had been framed in relation to 
human rights. The claims of proponents of human responsibilities sought to convince 
targeted audiences that the recognition of human responsibilities under international 
human rights law was necessary in order to enhance human rights protection. 
Clapham (1998) argues, however, that the issue is not ‘conceptual’ but ‘one of 
emphasis’. Indeed, the UDHR does make mention of individual ‘duties to the 
community’, as do the International Covenants on Human Rights. However, the 
traditional ‘approach’ of international human rights law is to recognise states as the 
primary bearers of obligation for human rights protection (Clapham, 1998; 
Hammarberg, 1999:i). Thus, Clapham (1998) refocused attention on the importance 
of state obligations in fulfilling human rights protection, as did AI (1998). 
 
Human responsibilities typically have been framed as ‘extra-legal’ in nature 
(Clapham, 1998; IAC, 1998; UNCHR, 2002a:9). The IAC (1998) and Martínez, 
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similarly, emphasised the ‘moral’ or ‘ethical’ duties and responsibilities of individuals 
(UNCHR, 2002a:9). The IAC (1998) argued that its declaration was conceptualised 
as a ‘morally binding’, rather than a ‘legally binding’ document. Opponents to this 
idea reframed human responsibilities as being ‘inconsistent’ with international human 
rights law, as confounding ‘legal’, ‘ethical’ and ‘moral’ duties and as conflating law 
with ethics and morality (Clapham, 1998; EU, 2004, 2005; Petrasek & Takahashi, 
1999:13-14). AI (1998:4) argued that the IAC had introduced ‘vague’, ‘ill-defined 
concepts’ that had the potential to ‘undermine’ and ‘weaken’ universally recognised 
human rights. In their references to the establishment of the ICC in 1998, AI (1998:6-
7), Robinson (1998b) and Clapham (1998), on behalf of the ICJ, commonly address 
the significance of enforcement of the ‘rule of law’ in the provision of human rights 
protection. 
 
Finally, human responsibilities typically had been framed as serving to 
‘balance’ human rights, by incorporating diverse cultural interpretations of human 
rights (IAC, 2013; UNCHR, 2005a:37). Opponents countered this cultural relativist 
claim as an evasion of state obligations, arguing that its adherents sought to 
‘substitute’ state obligations for human rights protection with specific duties and 
responsibilities of individuals, which are ‘inconsistent’ with the necessarily undefined 
‘duties to the community’ under the UDHR and the International Covenants on 
Human Rights (EU, 2004, 2005). Indeed, Knox (2008:34) contends that, rather than 
resulting from a misunderstanding of the ‘role’ of individual responsibility, the 
deliberate exclusion of individuals’ duties from human rights standards emanated 
from a legitimate ‘concern’ that governments potentially could depend on such duties 
to constrain rights.  
 
Reiterating the argument of Canadian human rights lawyer and academic 
Kathleen Mahoney (1947– ), Knox (2008:34) argues that ‘efforts’ to ‘balance’ human 
rights with responsibilities, actually, would serve to disturb the ‘existing balance’, 
causing ‘uncertainty’ and ‘confusion’ pertaining to the ‘meaning’ of international 
human rights standards. It is argued that such ‘efforts’, also, would constrain rights, 
by allowing governments potentially to ‘override rights’, according to their ‘interests’, 
as attempted by the Soviet Union during the drafting of the UDHR, ultimately 
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‘undermining’ the international human rights framework (Knox, 2008:34-35). Thus, 
opponents to the claims of human responsibilities initiatives, arguably, were effective 
in providing ‘credible’ justifications for the legitimacy and universality of human rights 
under international human rights law (Busby, 2007:253; Clapham, 1998). 
 
 
3.4. The Influence of Opposition on Transnational Campaigns for Human  
        Responsibilities 
 
The international political opportunity structure, arguably, has become 
‘relatively closed’ to the issue of human responsibilities. This is suggested not only 
by the ‘relative decline’ of human responsibilities campaigns during the 2000s and 
2010s, but also by the recent reactions by Western state and non-state actors to the 
drafting and adoption by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) of the 
ASEAN Human Rights Declaration (AHRD), a regional human rights instrument 
giving particular attention to individuals’ responsibilities (ASEAN, 2012; Loy, 2012). 
There has been firm resistance from Western human rights defenders, members of 
the Western press and Western governments, such as the US, to the approach of 
AHRD to balance human rights with individual responsibilities (AI, 2012a, 2012b; 
Baer, 2012; FIDH, 2012a, 2012b; HRW, 2012; Nuland, 2012).  
 
When the AHRD was adopted on November 19, 2012, Pillay, while welcoming 
the ‘renewed commitment’ of ASEAN leaders to ‘universal human rights norms’, had 
reiterated earlier concerns, regarding aspects of the AHRD containing ‘language’ 
that is inconsistent with international human rights standards, calling for a revision of 
the document (UN News Centre, 2012). At the time, Human Rights Watch (HRW) 
(2012) argued that the declaration ‘undermines’ international human rights 
standards, framing it as a statement of governmental authority masked as a 
‘declaration of human rights’. Furthermore, Pillay, members of the press and 
prominent human rights NGOs, including HRW (2012), AI (2012a, 2012b) and the 
Fédération Internationale des Droits de l’Homme (International Federation of Human 
Rights), commonly expressed concern that members of civil society in the region had 
not been consulted or included in the drafting of the declaration (“ASEAN Leaders 
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Adopt Lame-Duck Rights Declaration”, 2012; Baer, 2012; FIDH, 2012a, 2012b; UN 
News Centre, 2012).  
 
In attempting to explain the decreasing perceived political opportunities on the 
issue of human responsibilities and the resultant relative decline of transnational 
campaigns for human responsibilities since the mid-2000s, the significant impact of 
opposing initiatives to these campaigns should be recognised. The strategies and 
political outcomes of such opponents have affected the ability of human 
responsibilities campaigns to ‘survive’ and develop. Opposing initiatives, such as that 
of the EU (2004, 2005), used institutional tactics, as when in 2004 and 2005 the EU 
appealed to ECOSOC as the parent body of the UNCHR and, thus, a higher 
authority, to intervene to prevent the development of the DHSR.  
 
Furthermore, prominent human rights activists, such as Robinson (1998a:120) 
and human rights organisations, including AI (1998, 2005:43) and the ICJ, used 
institutional tactics when they raised the negative implications of the issue of human 
responsibilities from the standpoints of established ‘organisational platforms’ 
(Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:899). Opposing initiatives both to the IAC Declaration 
and to the DHSR made use of ‘regularly scheduled’ sessions and meetings to raise 
the issue by focusing on its negative implications (Busby, 2007:253; Clapham, 1998; 
EU, 2004, 2005; Robinson, 1998a:120). They also used ‘extra-institutional’ tactics, 
by offering alternative frames concerning the issue (Meyer & Staggenborg, 
1996:1650; Shawki, 2010:384). 
 
While the overarching objective of transnational campaigns for human 
responsibilities has been to see a universal declaration of human responsibilities 
adopted by the UNGA, the repeated ‘blocking’ of such attempts by opposing 
initiatives have created challenges for human responsibilities campaigns, which have 
been incapable of sustaining themselves indefinitely (Hertel, 2005:104). During the 
period between the late 1980s and the early 2000s, advocates for human 
responsibilities had ‘perceived’ a level of ‘permissiveness’ on the issue of human 
responsibilities (Busby, 2007:252; Meyer & Staggenborg, 1996:1636). However, 
after multiple setbacks, the perceived opportunities available to proponents of human 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 T
ow
n
68 
 
responsibilities, arguably, have lessened. Limited opportunities for ‘institutional 
action’ exist for human responsibilities campaigns, due to their specific target 
audience of the ‘polarised’ UNHRC membership, which comprises of a number of 
delegacies which persistently have opposed the issue (Meyer & Staggenborg, 
1996:1646).  
 
The political outcomes of opposing initiatives have affected the ‘tactical’ 
options available to human responsibilities campaigns (Meyer & Staggenborg, 
1996:1651). While the effectiveness of such opposing initiatives threatens the 
interests of human responsibilities initiatives, and potentially could give them greater 
motivation to ‘mobilise’ action, defeats of transnational advocacy efforts for human 
responsibilities have not opened opportunities for ‘counter-tactics’ (Meyer & 
Staggenborg, 1996:1645). The opposing initiatives of AI (1998) and the EU (2005), 
as well as the influence of the UNHCHR and the intervention by ECOSOC in the 
affairs of the UNCHR, arguably, altered the political opportunity structure, by limiting 
the opportunities available to human responsibilities campaigns. 
 
Although it is in the interest of campaigns, advocating for the adoption by the 
UNGA of a universal declaration of human responsibilities, to continue to lobby their 
preferred ‘strategic targets’ of relevant UN bodies, thus employing ‘direct means’ of 
influencing policy, derived from their ‘socially-constructed’ assessments of their 
‘resources’ and of their socio-political positions, they have been compelled by their 
opponents to move to venues in which their opponents have greater potential for 
success (Meyer & Staggenborg, 1996:1647-1648). For instance, when delegates 
representing the EU (2005) appealed to ECOSOC in the mid-2000s, proponents of 
the DHSR were forced to move to the arena of ECOSOC, where EU delegates were 
making progress, thus constraining the opportunities available to LMG delegates. 
 
As EU delegates, in 2005, were successful in impeding the development of a 
UN declaration on human responsibilities, transnational campaigns for human 
responsibilities, since, have tended to focus on alternative venues, offering greater 
perceived opportunities (Meyer & Staggenborg, 1996:1648-1649). Human 
responsibilities initiatives, also, have encountered limits specific to various venues, 
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for instance, the institutional ‘requirements’ and procedures of the UN system and its 
various bodies, including ECOSOC and the UNCHR. At these forums, decisions and 
resolutions are adopted by vote, thus limiting the opportunities available to initiatives 
advocating for human responsibilities. Opponents to human responsibilities initiatives 
have taken advantage of ‘divisions’ within the polarised memberships of UN bodies, 
such as the UNCHR and ECOSOC, by operating in ‘favourable’ venues and 
targeting ‘sympathetic elites’ (Meyer & Staggenborg, 1996:1650-1651).  
 
The following section seeks to portray the influence of counter-campaigns on 
the decline of transnational campaigns for human responsibilities, during the 2000s 
and 2010s. The reactions of human responsibilities initiatives have reflected a 
perception of declining political opportunity on the issue of human responsibilities. 
Due to closing opportunities, both structural and perceived, proponents of human 
responsibilities have been forced to modify their objectives, and the issue of human 
responsibilities, to an extent, has lost salience and prominence on the agendas of 
targeted audiences. 
 
  
3.4.1. Reactions of Advocates for Human Responsibilities to their Opponents 
 
Following widespread opposition to the IAC Declaration from Western state 
and non-state actors, the IAC responded primarily by defending the document, 
claiming that it was intended to supplement and complement the UDHR, rather than 
to weaken or undermine it. Amidst such opposition, members of the IAC considered 
how, further, to advocate and mediate for human responsibilities. Seeking further to 
educate target audiences about the idea, members of the IAC (1998) considered 
feasible strategies for further publicising the declaration at the 1998 ‘Steering 
Meeting’ (Giacomazzi, 2005:164-165; Hovey, 1997:214).  
 
The IAC (1998) sought to educate members of the Western press about the 
issue of human responsibilities and to facilitate agreement among disputants (Hovey, 
1997:214). The IAC (1998) responded to the press by acknowledging the legitimacy 
of their ‘concerns’ and decided, accordingly, to ‘revise’ several sections of the IAC 
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Declaration, which had placed limits on the freedom of the press (Giacomazzi, 
2005:173). It was decided that a ‘cover sentence’ should be provided on ‘ethical 
impulse’ in order to clarify that the IAC Declaration was intended as a ‘moral appeal’ 
and concerned matters of ‘conscience’ and ‘ethical behaviour’, rather than of 
‘imposed obligations’, and that Article 14 would be redrafted clearly to state that 
members of the press would judge whether they are being responsible (IAC, 1998). 
It was argued that it should be clarified that members of ‘professions’ would remain 
responsible for the establishment of their own ‘appropriate ethical codes’, reflecting 
the ‘prioritisation’ of ‘general standards’, concerning such values as ‘truthfulness’ and 
‘fairness’ (IAC, 1998). 
 
Taking advantage of sympathetic partners and allies, members of the IAC 
(1998) decided that former Finnish PM Taisto Kalevi Sorsa (1930–2004) would 
represent the IAC at the ‘Forty-Seventh Annual Meeting of the International Press 
Institute’ in Moscow toward the end of May, 1998, in order to liaise with relevant 
‘journalists’. Seeking to facilitate agreement between disputants, members of the IAC 
(1998) proposed a ‘discussion’ with a wide range of representatives of the press, 
particularly with the WFPC (Hovey, 1997:216-217). It was argued, further, that it 
would be beneficial to consult with organisations with independent ‘committees on 
press responsibility’ and ethics, such as the Newspaper Association of America and 
the Associated Press Managing Editors’ Association, in order to determine their 
perspectives on the issue of human responsibilities (IAC, 1998). Furthermore, 
members of the IAC (1998) decided to arrange meetings with media groups, 
particularly those who had ‘expressed concern’, in order to explain their intentions 
behind the IAC Declaration, as well as to propose various amendments to the 
document. 
 
Following opposition by Western states and human rights organisations, 
including AI, to the proposed DHSR, LMG states, particularly China, reacted to their 
opposition by refocusing the contentious issue of human responsibilities on the 
alleged ‘double standards’ of their opponents (EU, 2004; Yishanat, 2004). Chinese 
delegate Zhang Yishanat (2004), on behalf of the LMG, contended that attempts, 
particularly of delegates representing the EU (2004), to prevent the OHCHR from 
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reporting on other delegates’ views on the DHSR reflected the self-interested 
behaviour and ‘double standards’ of such Western states, with regard to their 
promotion of human rights, particularly the right to free expression (UNCHR, 2004a; 
2005a).  
 
At the UNCHR, in 2004, a number of LMG states, including Cuba and various 
other Islamic, African and Asian states, had contended that Western democracies 
tended to politicise their ‘criticisms’ of other states’ ‘human rights performances’ and 
that they were more were more inclined to confront states on such matters, rather 
than to engage in ‘dialogue’ and ‘cooperation’ (UN Information Service, 2004). The 
claim made by Yishanat (2004) in 2004 was a reiteration of similar claims previously 
made by various delegates representing LMG states at the UN, such as that offered 
by Mahbubani at the Fifty-Third Session of the UNGA, regarding the ‘double 
standards’ of Western states in matters pertaining to human rights (UNGA, 1998b). 
Thus, the framing by Yishanat of the EU (2004) as reflecting ‘double standards’ in its 
delegacies’ attempts to ‘block’ deliberations on the DHSR, ‘resonated’ with previous 
claims regarding Western states’ stance on human rights and, arguably, was 
effective in limiting such efforts of the EU (Hertel, 2005:104; Yishanat, 2004). 
 
Arguably, the efforts by delegates representing the EU (2004, 2005) to ‘block’ 
further deliberations on the issue of human responsibilities were more successful at 
the 2005 Annual Substantive Session of ECOSOC (2004) than they were the 
previous year, because the focus was on the issue of either continuing or 
discontinuing the study on human rights and human responsibilities, rather than on 
the issue of whether or not the OHCHR should compile opinions on the DHSR 
(Hertel, 2005:104; UNCHR, 2004a, 2005a, 2005b). When the EU (2004, 2005) 
attempted to ‘block’ the OHCHR from inquiring into other delegates’ views on the 
DHSR in 2004, Yishanat had taken the opportunity to accuse the EU of seeking to 
violate other delegates’ right to free expression (ECOSOC, 2004; UNCHR, 2005b; 
Yishanat, 2004). However, in 2005 the focus directly was placed on the subject of 
human responsibilities and whether the study on human rights and human 
responsibilities should be continued (EU, 2005). Thus, the LMG, arguably, had fewer 
perceived political opportunities to accuse the EU (2005) of having ‘double 
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standards’ and of seeking to ’undermine’ the rights of other delegates (Yishanat, 
2004). 
 
 
3.4.2. The Modified Objectives of Transnational Campaigns for Human  
Responsibilities 
 
When there was firm opposition to the IAC Declaration from Western state 
and non-state actors, the IAC (1998) began to ‘modify’ its ‘immediate objectives’ and 
discussed possible routes of procedure and available tactics and strategies, 
including a ‘revision’ of the declaration. While there was still a perception of 
opportunity and ‘openness’ on the issue of human responsibilities at the 1998 
‘Steering Meeting’, the immediate objective of having the declaration presented to 
the UNGA for adoption on the fiftieth anniversary of its adoption of the UDHR was 
‘modified’ to proposing that it should be ‘discussed’ by the UNGA (Giacomazzi, 
2005:164-165; IAC, 1998). Since the Western support necessary for the adoption of 
the declaration within the year of 1998 was unlikely, the IAC (1998) suggested that it 
should be introduced by a group of ‘appropriate’ states, which could refer it to the 
UNGA at a more suitable time. Acknowledging the parallel advocacy efforts of 
various independent human responsibilities initiatives, including those of the ICHD 
and UNESCO, members of the IAC (1998) and of the CR have recognised the 
potential mutual advantages of ‘coordinated action’, as the ‘attention’ of targeted 
audiences could be diverted by too many advocates (Suter, 2012:50). 
 
However, following the unsuccessful efforts of LMG delegates to lobby for the 
development of a UN declaration on human responsibilities, the issue arguably has 
developed a perception of being relatively ‘closed’. Delegacies representing the LMG 
at the UN, arguably, no longer have a perception of perceived opportunity with 
regard to the promotion of the DHSR. The dominant perspective at the UNHRC 
concerning the issue of human responsibilities, arguably, is one of opposition to the 
adoption by the UNGA of such a declaration. Furthermore, following the passing 
away in 2010 of Martínez, as author of the study on human rights and human 
responsibilities and of the DHSR, the LMG since has lacked a ‘political’, or ‘norm’, 
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‘entrepreneur’, who would be willing to advocate persistently for human 
responsibilities at the UNHRC (Carpenter, 2007:114).  
 
 
3.4.3. Shifting Arenas of Collective Action for Proponents of Human  
Responsibilities 
 
At the 1998 ‘Steering Meeting’, the IAC (1998) decided to continue to lobby 
the UN, but, also, to seek additional sources of support for the IAC Declaration, by 
initiating discussions in multiple arenas, including ‘foreign affairs’ sectors, ‘scientific’ 
and academic arenas and prominent national news companies. As the IAC (1998) 
had encountered political and policy ‘setbacks’ at its targeted collective action venue 
of the UN, IAC members, seeking to ‘innovate tactically’, ‘shifted’ their attention to 
alternative venues, selecting those reflective of their ‘ideologies’ and ‘resources’ and 
according to ‘perceived’ opportunities and ‘advantages’ in various ‘social’ or ‘political 
institutions’ (Meyer & Staggenborg, 1996:1647-1648, 1651).  
 
Seeking Western support, members of the IAC (1998, 2000), in March, 1998, 
considered the possibility of arranging to meet with the Universities of Oxford and 
Harvard and, since then, have advocated for human responsibilities at a number of 
‘prominent Western universities’ (Giacomazzi, 2005:164). At a seminar on 
enlightened leadership and human responsibility on May 10-11, 2000, at the 
University of Harvard, members of the IAC (2000), including Schmidt, noted their 
continued efforts toward promoting the IAC Declaration. Five years later, at the 
‘Human Rights and Human Responsibilities Symposium’ at the Santa Clara 
University School of Law on April 1, 2005, Mia Giacomazzi (2005:164) presented a 
paper on the ‘necessary balance’ between human rights and human responsibilities, 
focusing primarily on the initiative of the IAC. At the time, Giacomazzi (2005) made 
no mention of and seemed unaware of the efforts by LMG delegates to mediate for 
such a declaration at the UNCHR during the temporal period at which the 
symposium took place. Indeed, unless an active ‘decision’ was made to publicise a 
particular issue being debated at the UNCHR, such deliberations remained 
concealed (Alvarez, 2005:436).   
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The IAC Declaration was adopted by the PWR in 2010 and by a number of 
additional organisations, while a number of members of the IAC (2005), including 
some of its drafters, continue to promote the ideals presented within it (Suter, 
2012:49; Swidler, 2007). Continuing to advocate for human responsibilities, Küng 
established the ‘Global Ethic Foundation’ at the University of Tübingen and 
continues to recommend the establishment of global ethical standards through his 
lectures and the website of the Foundation (Suter, 2012:49). Furthermore, Swidler 
(2007) authored an article, which was published in 2007, on the need for a ‘universal 
declaration of a global ethic’, based on the UDHR. Suter (2012:51), a member of the 
CR, also, has given ‘public presentations’ in Western states on the need for a 
declaration of human responsibilities and, recently, has authored an article on the 
development of human responsibilities initiatives. 
 
 
3.5. Conclusion 
 
This chapter has proposed that the issue of human responsibilities is under 
intense pressure from influential Western governments and prominent members of 
Western civil society, actors comprising the key targeted audiences of transnational 
campaigns for human responsibilities. The ongoing potential  for ‘counter-
mobilisation’ by such state and non-state actors poses ongoing challenges to 
transnational campaigns for human responsibilities, most notably involving the forced 
requirement for such initiatives to make use of collective action venues other than 
the UN, thus compelling them to modify their primary objective of seeing a universal 
declaration of human responsibilities adopted by the UNGA. 
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Chapter 4 
Conclusion 
 
4.1. Summary and Conclusions 
 
Given the volatile nature of ongoing conflicts over values during deliberations 
on international standard-setting, this dissertation has not sought to arrive at 
conclusive answers regarding the potential for the creation of international standards 
on human responsibilities, but to emphasise the contextual factors, both structural 
and non-structural, that previously have had, and likely will continue to have, a 
significant influence on the efforts of transnational campaigns for human 
responsibilities. Indeed, ‘structural’ aspects of the international political opportunity 
structure, including institutional access and procedures and the potential for ‘counter-
mobilisation’ on the issue of human responsibilities, as well as ‘non-structural’ 
contextual factors, such as diverse values, beliefs, ideas and political alignment over 
such ideas, collectively aid in explaining the available opportunities, both structural 
and perceived, and strategies and tactics employed by human responsibilities 
campaigns. Such factors serve to shed light, also, on the political and policy 
outcomes of such campaigns. 
 
Given the traditional approach of international human rights law to assign 
legally the primary obligations for human rights protection to states, it is unlikely that 
a universal declaration of human responsibilities, which assigns moral or ethical 
duties and responsibilities to individuals, will be adopted by the UN. While advocates 
for human responsibilities likely will continue to pursue their goals, it is probable that 
they will continue to do so in alternative collective action venues, as political 
opportunities on the issue at the targeted venue of the UN likely will continue to 
diminish, following the continuing development of persuasive arguments regarding 
human responsibilities, raised by prominent and influential Western state and non-
state actors, notably including human rights NGOs, such as AI and the ICJ. 
 
A significant finding of this dissertation is that many of the same actors have 
been involved in countering initiatives for human responsibilities, and such 
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opposition generally has been initiated on similar grounds. Indeed, the delegates and 
human rights NGO observers involved in the drafting of the DHRD and the ensuing 
debate in 1993 also were involved in opposing and obstructing the development and 
adoption of the IAC Declaration, the DHSR and, most recently, the AHRD (AI, 1998, 
2005, 2012a, 2012b; EU, 2004, 2005; UNCHR, 1993). Reactions by Western 
governments, such as the US, the Western press, the UNHCHR and prominent 
international human rights organisations, including AI and HRW, to the approach 
taken by the AHRD to balance human rights with individual responsibilities 
commonly suggest that the international political opportunity structure remains 
‘relatively closed’ to the issue of human responsibilities (AI, 2012a, 2012b; Baer, 
2012; Nuland, 2012). This dissertation, therefore, predicts that there will be 
continued challenges and constraints to transnational campaigns for human 
responsibilities. 
 
 
4.2. Suggestions for Further Research 
 
Reiterating the argument of a number of critics on the literature on social 
movements and norm evolution, there is a need for additional research on 
transnational campaigns that ‘target’ not only ‘states’ but also ‘global institutions’ 
(Hawkins, 1999:121; Moghadam, 2000:724). Indeed, the targets of advocacy efforts 
by advocates for human responsibilities, simultaneously, have been national 
governments and the various bodies and agencies of the globalised institution of the 
UN, particularly UNESCO, the UNCHR and ECOSOC. While a number of authors, 
including Hovey (1997), as well as Chapman and Ramsay (2011), have conducted 
studies on initiatives at UN bodies, including the UNCHR, theory regarding such 
cases, arguably, is underdeveloped. With regard to the facilitating and constraining 
factors affecting the development of international standards on human 
responsibilities, it would be helpful to compare both structural and non-structural 
aspects of the political opportunity structure of the UNHRC with that of its 
predecessor, the UNCHR. 
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Furthermore, another common critique on social movement and norm 
evolution theories worth noting is their general neglect of ‘unsuccessful’ cases of 
transnational advocacy efforts (Carpenter, 2007:117; Keck & Sikkink, 1998:39-40; 
Hawkins, 1999:121). Indeed, there is a need for research on both positive and 
‘negative’ political ‘outcomes’ of advocacy and mediation efforts for human 
responsibilities (Hawkins, 1999:121). Considering the relevance of particular 
contextual factors in constraining the activities and outcomes of transnational 
campaigns for human responsibilities, theories providing explanations for policy 
outcomes could be enhanced by offering a more lateral approach that takes into 
account a broad range of issues, rather than to focus exclusively on more 
straightforward factors explaining successful cases. 
 
Considering that agency plays a significant role in influencing the availability 
of institutional access, perceived opportunities, strategies, tactics and political 
outcomes, it also would be beneficial to conduct further research into the identities of 
UN delegates and experts, including incumbent high commissioners for human rights 
and delegates at the UNHRC, with particular regard to the influence of such roles 
and identities on international standard-setting (Busby, 2007:254; Carpenter, 
2007:117; Lind, & Stepan-Norris, 2011; Meyer & Staggenborg, 2007:3). Inquiry into 
the identities of human rights defenders and other significant ‘policy gatekeepers’, 
such as UN officials including the UNSG and the UNHCHR, as well as relevant 
members of prominent international human rights organisations, also, should provide 
informative findings regarding outcomes of human rights-related policy in additional 
cases (Busby, 2007:254-255; Carpenter, 2007:114-115; Fukuda-Parr & Hulme, 
2011:17).  
 
Furthermore, as the primary promoters of the IAC Declaration, as well as 
former UNHCHR Robinson, were former heads of government, it, arguably, is 
essential, also, to explore the effects of the historical backgrounds of relevant actors 
on their agency in advocating for or against a particular transnational campaign. 
Furthermore, as the contextual factor of poor human rights records of various LMG 
states effectively constrained the political opportunities available to proponents of the 
DHSR, including such key ‘political entrepreneurs’ as Martínez, it seems necessary 
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to consider the political contexts of delegates at the UNHRC as relevant in explaining 
policy outcomes. 
 
Finally, a finding of this study has been that, in addition to the role of the mass 
media in encouraging the emergence of opposing initiatives, as journalists focused 
on opposing ‘interests’ in response to the claims of transnational campaigns for 
human responsibilities, leading academics and experts tended to play a similar role 
(Clapham, 1998; Gamson & Meyer, 1996:287-288; Knox, 2008; Meyer & 
Staggenborg, 1996:1641-1642). Indeed, a number of theorists have noted the 
significant role played by ‘epistemic communities’, comprised of specialised ‘experts’, 
the press and ‘religious figures’, in enhancing the ‘credibility’ of a particular 
campaign’s efforts (Busby, 2007:253). Thus, a potentially insightful path of research 
could be to study additional cases in which the role of prominent or influential 
academics or experts was significant in seeking out and advocating for opposing 
interests in response to the claims of transnational campaigns. As similar cases of 
successful ‘counter-campaigning’ with regard to human rights issues, imaginably, 
would occur intermittently within the bodies and specialised agencies of the UN, 
particularly the UNHRC and ECOSOC, inquiry into such cases would add value to 
the theoretical literature on intergovernmental political opportunity structures, while 
providing useful insights for transnational campaigns. 
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